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Abstract
This paper critically surveys the key literature on corporate financing policy,
capital structure and firm ownership in order to identify the leading
theoretical and empirical issues in this area. The theoretical component of the
survey attempts to reconcile competing theories of capital structure and
appraises recent models which use agency theory and asymmetric
information to explore the impact of managerial shareholdings, corporate
strategy and taxation on the firm’s capital structure. The empirical component
focuses on univariate analyses as well as multivariate models of capital
structure, and makes a comparison between theoretical predictions and
empirical results. Implications are identified in terms of promising research
ideas (PRIs) for further research. The bulk of the empirical research that we
survey is concerned with the experience of a few western industrial countries,
and the implications of this research are assessed accordingly. However, we
also aim to draw out implications for new research in developing and newly
industrialised countries with an expanding corporate sector.
*) This paper is based on chapter 2 of Sanjiva Prasad’s PhD thesis at Cardiff Business
School (Prasad, 2000). Useful comments on a previous version of this paper were received
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Financing policy by firms requires managers to identify ways of funding new
investment. The managers may exercise three main choices: use retained
earnings, borrow through debt instruments, or issue new shares. Hence, the
standard capital structure of a firm includes retained earnings, debt and
equity; these three components of capital structure reflect firm ownership
structure in the sense that the first and third components reflect ownership by
shareholders while the second component represents ownership by
debtholders. This is the pattern found in developing and developed countries
alike (see La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer, 1999).
1 Capital structure
also affects corporate behaviour (Hutton and Kenc, 1998). Thus, financing
policy, capital structure and firm ownership are all strongly linked in
explaining how economic agents form and modify their asset-acquisition
behaviour through firms and capital markets, and thereby influence their
incomes and returns to asset holdings, whether in the form of direct
remuneration, capital gains or dividends.
There is a large volume of research on these issues in industrial countries, but
virtually no work has been done on developing countries, apart from a limited
amount of empirical research by, for example, Hamid and Singh (1992),
Singh (1995), Hussain (1995), Brada and Singh (1999) and Prasad (2000). It
is scarcely an exaggeration to state that, until recently, corporate finance did
not exist as an area of research investigation in developing countries. Some of
the reasons for this are clear. Many developing countries initially chose
a state-sponsored route to development, with a relatively insignificant role
assigned to the private corporate sector. In the poorer countries, irrespective
of development strategy, there is only an embryonic corporate sector.
Moreover, most of the corporate financing needs were met by regional and
international development banks, which either took an equity interest in the
firms or provided the debt component of a firm’s capital. However, in almost
all these countries, development banks have experienced serious difficulties
(Murinde, 1996; Murinde and Kariisa-Kasa, 1997). Thus, there is
a conspicuous gap in the empirical research on corporate finance in
developing countries; this gap requires urgent attention, given that the
7
1 La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (1999) survey firm ownership around the world.
See also the literature on ownership and firm value; for example, Griffith (1999).research is likely to have profound policy implications for promoting poverty-
reducing economic growth.
This paper conducts a critical survey of the key literature in order to isolate
the leading theoretical and empirical issues surrounding company financing
policy, capital structure, and ownership that are particularly relevant for
developing economies. The idea is to take stock of existing knowledge in this
area and identify the main strands of the theoretical and empirical literature,
considering the policy implications of existing knowledge, and spelling out
the current policy problems which should be addressed by future research. As
the subject area is vast, the survey is highly selective. Well-known theories
are not discussed at length; only the main arguments within the literature are
highlighted. Also, we concentrate, as far as possible, on the direct
relationships among financing, capital structure and ownership. We do not
explicitly cover the numerous topics, such as dividend policy, which are more
or less indirectly related to capital structure but which are the subject of
a substantial literature in their own right. In the empirical part of the survey,
we again concentrate on research involving the direct description and analysis
of capital structure and ownership, especially orthodox regression studies
whose main goal is usually to understand the temporal and, more particularly,
the cross-sectional differences among companies’ capital structures. In
general, we do not cover research based on event studies, although we do cite
such studies where relevant. Event studies constitute a vast and varied
literature in their own right and it has been the subject of several recent
surveys, an example being MacKinley (1997). Likewise, we do not dwell in
detail on each individual set of results from the industrial countries. Rather,
we summarize the main results, and seek to evaluate their implications for
developing countries. Of course, we also draw on the small body of research
that is directly concerned with developing countries.
The literature as a whole is fragmented, and there are numerous ways in
which a review could be organised. We chose to follow the approach of Harris
and Raviv (1991) in organizing the survey around the “driving forces” behind
financing policy and capital structure. This method is used since it does not
suffer from the unnecessary repetition that characterises some other
approaches.
2 The theoretical component of the survey draws extensively on
Masulis (1988) and Harris and Raviv (1991), but also substantively extends
their work by examining the impact of managerial shareholdings, corporate
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2 See Cleaver (1990) for the “mother-daughter” and Masulis’ (1988) “wishing list”
approaches of organising the literature.strategy and taxation on the firm’s capital structure. Sections 2–4 of the paper
cover the leading issues in the theoretical literature; section 2 focuses on
agency theory and capital structure; asymmetric information models are
discussed in section 3; section 4 addresses the issue of taxation.
The empirical component of the survey distinguishes first between univariate
and multivariate studies, the former aimed at documenting basic facts and
testing general descriptive hypotheses, the latter typically using a regression
approach to test more specific, theoretical hypotheses. Much of the empirical
literature on developing countries is in the form of univariate studies.
Univariate studies of developed and developing countries are discussed in
section 5. Section 6 contains a preliminary overview of the main empirical
methods used in multivariate research, before we turn to the main research
results themselves. Most multivariate studies can be interpreted either as
a precise test of a certain theory, or more loosely, as a test of the role of
particular variables in determining capital structure, such variables usually
serving as measures of some specific predictions of a more general theory.
Accordingly, section 7 discusses studies that investigate the following: the
influence of ownership and control structures on capital structure; the role of
bankruptcy costs; the influence of corporate strategy; and tests of the pecking
order hypothesis against trade-off theories. In section 8, we organize the
results by explanatory variable, and review particularly the influence on
capital structure of: tangibility, size, profitability, growth, risk, non-debt tax
shields, and the industrial classification of firms. The major empirical
research findings are organized in a way that allows comparisons to be made
between theoretical predictions and empirical results. Promising research
ideas (PRIs) are identified to form the context for future research relating to
“corporate finance and development”, and these are set out in the final
section, 9.
Introduction 92. Agency Theory and Capital Structure
2.1 The background: reconciling Modigliani-Miller and the traditional
theories
The background to the modern debate on corporate capital structure derives
from Modigliani and Miller (MM, 1958). MM’s paper overturned the
traditional view of corporate finance (TV). The latter is based on the
firm’s weighted average cost of capital (ra) i.e. the weighted sum of debt
and equity costs or the minimum overall return that is required on existing
operations to satisfy the demands of all stakeholders. TV begins with the
observation that debt is generally cheaper than equity as a source of
investment finance. Hence, a firm can lower its average cost of capital by
increasing its debt relative to equity (i.e. its leverage), provided the
firm’s cost of debt and equity remain constant. However, this process
cannot be extended indefinitely because, in reality, higher levels of debt
increase the likelihood of default resulting in debtholders and shareholders
each demanding greater returns on their capital. Therefore, the ra schedule
is U-shaped when plotted against leverage, with the cost of debt and equity
both rising at an increasing rate as bankruptcy risk increases. The
corresponding company market value schedule is an inverted U-shape.
Optimal leverage occurs where ra is minimised and the value of the firm is
maximised.
Unlike the TV, MM assumes a perfect capital market and uses a simple
arbitrage mechanism to derive three, now well-known, propositions relating
to: the value of the firm, the behaviour of the equity cost of capital, and the
cut-off rate for new investment. MM’s Proposition I states that the market
value of any firm is independent of its capital structure. Hence, the
firm’s average cost of capital is also independent of its capital structure. It
does not have an “optimal”, market-value maximising, debt-equity ratio: any
degree of leverage is as good as any other. This is a consequence of the perfect
capital markets assumption, which implies that both the ra and the market
value schedules are horizontal, when plotted against leverage.
MM’s Proposition II states that the rate of return required by shareholders
rises linearly as the firm’s debt-equity ratio increases. That is, the cost of
equity rises so as to offset exactly any benefits accrued by the use of cheap
debt. However, some criticisms of this proposition show that a disparity
normally exists between the capitalisation rate and the cut-off rate (see, for
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example, Peyser, 1999). Proposition III states that a firm will only undertake
investments whose returns are at least equal to ra.
There are two essential differences between the conclusions of TV and those
of MM. First, under TV, the firm’s value and cost of capital are related to its
capital structure, whereas MM’s Proposition I states that they are
independent of capital structure. Second, under MM’s Proposition II, if
management aim to maximise shareholder returns, they would employ debt
until 100 percent leverage is reached. Clearly this cannot be precisely true,
since a firm which is 100% debt-financed is technically bankrupt.
3 However,
MM’s Proposition II does imply a linear relationship between shareholders’
rate of return and firm leverage. Thus, at low levels of debt, the cost of equity
rises faster under MM than under TV. At higher levels of debt, the risk of
default increases, and the cost of equity rises faster under TV than under
MM’s Proposition II.
An alternative argument for the TV relates to the comparative advantage of
firms over households in the debt market. If transactions costs are such that
the costs of borrowing are higher for shareholders than for firms, it may be
cheaper for investors to borrow via a firm by purchasing its shares. Investors
who have higher costs of borrowing will be willing to pay a higher premium
for the shares of levered firms than will low-cost borrowers. Also, as
a firm’s leverage increases, the number of investors willing to hold its shares
will decrease. The counter-argument in the spirit of MM is to question the
assumption that firms do, in fact, have a comparative advantage in the debt
market. If they do not, investors will be indifferent between the shares of
a leveraged firm and “home-made” leverage: a combination of shares in an
unlevered firm and their own debt.
MM’s propositions have to be modified to accommodate taxation, a topic
we take up in detail in section 4, and financial distress. Proposition II
implies that maximising the return on shareholders’ equity is equivalent to
100% debt financing. This is based on two assumptions: (i) the firm does not
face any costs associated with financial distress which rise as the level of
leverage increases; and (ii) the marginal rate of return which debt holders
require remains constant. In reality, it is more likely that the higher the
3 If the firm is bankrupt, its shares are worthless, and lenders become the new owners of
the firm. They in turn will demand the same rate of return on their capital since they now bear
all the firm’s business risk. Firms do not, in fact, swing from being 100 percent equity financed
to 100 percent debt financed, or bankrupt, and back to being 100 percent equity financed again.12 Agency Theory and Capital Structure
leverage of a company, the greater its liquidation costs. Moreover, as
leverage rises, the risk of default also rises, resulting in debtholders
demanding a higher rate of return for them to hold an additional unit of
debt. This situation is compounded if there are multiple debt claims each
having different rights.
4
In general, therefore, market imperfections such as taxes and financial
distress affect the firm’s capital structure. There are many other market
imperfections, especially those which are characteristic of developing
economies, such as the costs associated with asymmetric information, and
conflicts between economic agents associated with the firm, as well as with
capital markets. These are discussed below.
2.2 Agency costs
The seminal work on agency theory and capital structure is Jensen and
Meckling (1976); the main extensions of the seminal work include Ross
(1973), Shavell (1979), Fama (1980, 1990), Arrow (1985) and Jensen and
Meckling (1992). Here, a particular single-owner firm wishes to finance
projects in excess of the firm’s internal resources. The firm has two options:
to issue equity or debt. If the firm issues equity, the owner-
manager’s fractional interest within the firm decreases. This increases the
incentives for an owner-manager to undertake excessive perk consumption
since the costs to the owner of such activities have been lowered as a result
of a reduction in his fractional interest. Such costs include: (i) the monitoring
expenses of the principal (the equity holders); (ii) the bonding expenses of the
agent (the manager); and (iii) the money value of the reduction in welfare
experienced by the principal due to the divergence between the
agent’s decisions and those which maximise the welfare of the principal.
However, in the presence of efficient markets which incorporate expectations,
external investors anticipate such actions by the owner-manager of the firm
(see, for example, James, 1999). Accordingly, the price of new equity is
discounted to take into account the monitoring costs of external shareholders.
Under these circumstances, the owner-manager would prefer to finance new
projects using debt rather than equity.
4 If the managers want to maximise the value of the firm, the difference between the
benefits and costs of debt must be maximised. The optimal level of debt is determined at the
point when the marginal gain from leverage is equal to the marginal expected loss associated
with increased financial distress. Accordingly, the value of the firm is inversely related to its
probability of financial distress and to the discount at which its assets may be disposed of in
a forced saleHowever, issuing debt to finance investment also incurs agency costs. These
arise as a result of the conflict of interest between external lenders and the
owner-manager. The issue of debt increases the owner-manager’s incentive to
invest in high-risk projects which, if successful, offer high returns which
accrue exclusively to the owner-manager but at the same time, increase the
likelihood of failure. If the projects fail, the owner-manager’s exposure is
limited to the value of his equity holdings. Debt-holders on the other hand do
not share the profits of success, but will share in the costs of a bankruptcy:
they are incurring extra risk without additional expected returns. Debt-holders
can be thought of as having written a European Put on the firm’s assets, with
bankruptcy corresponding to exercise of the Put by shareholders. As the
amount of debt increases, debtholders will demand a higher premium to
compensate them for the increased probability of failure. Thus, the agency
costs of debt include the opportunity costs caused by the impact of debt on the
investment decisions of the firm; the monitoring and bond expenditures by
both the bondholders and the owner-manager; and the costs associated with
bankruptcy and reorganisation (see, for example, Hunsaker, 1999).
Since equity and debt both incur agency costs; the optimal debt-equity ratio
involves a trade-off between the two types of cost. Agency costs associated
with equity are at a maximum when the owner-manager’s share of equity is
zero, and the firm is wholly owned by outside shareholders. These costs fall
to zero as the owner-manager’s equity share rises to 100%. Similarly, the
agency costs of debt are at a maximum when all external funds are obtained
from debt. As the level of debt falls, agency costs are reduced: first, because
the amount of wealth that can be reallocated away from debt-holders falls;
and second, since the fraction of equity held by the owner-manager is being
reduced, the owner-manager’s share of any reallocation also falls. The total
agency cost schedule is therefore a U-shaped function of the ratio of debt to
outside equity; and the optimal ratio of debt to outside equity is that which
minimises total agency costs.
When a firm is close to bankruptcy, equityholders have no incentive to inject
new capital into value-increasing projects since the returns of such a venture
will accrue mainly to debtholders. Thus, the larger the debt level of the firm,
the less the incentive to invest in value-increasing projects. Myers (1977)
notes that this has specific implications for the nature of debt contracts, and
for the characteristics of highly levered firms. First, we would expect bond
contracts to include features which prevent “asset substitution”, such as the
sale of profitable parts of the business to finance new high-risk projects.
Second, industries which have limited scope for such asset substitution
Agency Theory and Capital Structure 13should have higher levels of debt, ceteris paribus; for example: regulated
public utilities, banks and firms in mature industries with low growth
potential. Third, firms with low growth prospects and strong cash flows
should have high amounts of debt that would use up resources that would
otherwise be used for perquisites. Such firms are typically thought to be those
in “mature” industries, such as steel, chemicals, brewing and tobacco.
2.3 Conflicts between equityholders and managers
The conflict between equityholders and managers takes several distinct
forms. The first, pointed out by Jensen and Meckling (1976), is that managers
prefer to have greater perquisite levels and lower effort levels, provided that
they do not have to pay for these through lower wages or by a lower market
value of their personal equity holdings. A second arises because managers
may prefer short-term projects, which produce early results and enhance their
reputation quickly, rather than more profitable long-term projects. On this
point, see Masulis (1988). Third, managers may prefer less risky investments
and lower leverage to lessen the probability of bankruptcy. See Hunsaker
(1999). Fourth, managers will wish to minimise the likelihood of employment
termination. As this increases with changes in corporate control, management
may resist take-overs, irrespective of their effect on shareholder value. See
Garvey and Hanka (1999). Managers and shareholders may also disagree over
a firm’s operating decisions: Harris and Raviv (1990) observe that managers
will typically wish to continue operating the firm even if liquidation is
preferred by shareholders
5; managers may also prefer to invest all available
funds even if shareholders want to be paid dividends.
6 On both these points,
see Stulz (1990).
An equally varied menu of solutions has been proposed to resolve or at least
limit these principal-agent problems. For example, Jensen (1986) argued that
management prefers to increase firm size, whereas shareholders are seeking
14 Agency Theory and Capital Structure
5 Debt gives investors the option of liquidation if cash flow is poor. The costs here are the
information costs associated with determining whether or not liquidation should occur. Higher
levels of debt make default more likely thereby making the liquidation decision more
appetising. Consequently, firms with higher liquidation values will have more debt than those
with lower liquidation values, ceteris paribus.
6 Here, the optimal capital structure is determined by trading off the benefit of debt in
preventing investment in value-decreasing projects against the cost of debt in impeding
investment in value-increasing projects. Thus firms with good investment opportunities have
low debts. Furthermore, those firms which have more value-increasing investments than value-
decreasing investments will have less debt, ceteris paribus.to maximise the value of their shares. Management will attempt to evade
shareholder control by financing less profitable projects using internal funds,
which are subject to a minimum of external monitoring. Shareholders can
prevent management from undertaking unprofitable expansion by reducing
this “free” cash flow. This can be done either by increasing the
firm’s dividend payment or by increasing its leverage. As Hunsaker (1999)
points out, an increase in leverage also increases the risk of bankruptcy, and
therefore limits management’s consumption of perquisites.
Other vehicles for removing shareholder-manager conflicts include the
provision of incentive-compatible managerial contracts, and the role of the
managerial labour market in exerting discipline on managerial behaviour.
Shleifer and Vishny (1989) develop a model in which a manager has an
incentive to invest the firm’s resources in those assets that are more highly
valued under that manager than under the next best alternative manager. By
this means, the manager counters the disciplinary forces: of the managerial
labour market, of product market competition, of the threat of take-over, and
of a monitoring board of directors. If successful, managers can demand higher
compensation together with greater autonomy. Shleifer and Vishny show that,
when investment projects are irreversible, the firm over-invests in those
specific projects whose value is greater under one particular manager than
under the next best manager. Such specific projects incur two distinct types of
loss: (i) a social cost in relation to investments not being value maximising,
and (ii) a transfer of economic rent from shareholders to managers. This
analysis helps explain why managers like growth: growth promotes those
areas specific to the manager’s skills and provides management benefits
through entrenchment. However, Jensen and Meckling (1976), Green (1984),
and Smith and Warner (1979) argue that management can still be disciplined
by the use of convertible debt. Convertibles reduce the agency costs of
monitoring because they give lenders an opportunity to share in
a firm’s profits. It may be expected that the greater the growth opportunities
available to a firm, the greater the probability that management will over-
invest. This implies a positive relationship between firm growth opportunities
and the level of convertible debt, and a negative relationship between growth
and ordinary (long-term) debt.
A more radical solution to shareholder-manager conflicts is proposed by
Kensinger and Martin (1986). They argue that, if the firm is reorganised into
a limited partnership (or royalty trusts), the managing partner has limited
discretion in dividend/re-investment decisions. The re-investment of profits is
in the hands of individual partners (shareholders) which reduces the manager-
Agency Theory and Capital Structure 15shareholder agency costs by removing the management’s decision-making
power.
An alternative approach to analysing shareholder-manager conflicts uses
transactions-cost economics, developed particularly by Williamson (1988). In
this approach debt and equity are regarded as vehicles for corporate
governance rather than as financial instruments; see, for example, Core,
Holthausen and Larcker (1999), Brada and Singh (1999), and Vilasuso and
Minkler (2001). Williamson (1988) argued that the financial structure of a firm
is affected by the “specificity” of the different types of assets that it owns.
“Specificity” concerns the extent to which assets can be redeployed in different
investment projects, with only limited modifications. Evidently, the more
specific the asset, the lower will be its liquidation value. In this context, debt
acts as a straitjacket for investment opportunities: lenders will not lend to very
specific projects since, in the event of failure (liquidation), the amount realised
will be very low. Thus, leverage should decrease as the degree of asset
specificity rises. Equity-holders are less affected by specificity, since they
necessarily surrender the firm’s assets to lenders at liquidation. In total, as asset
specificity rises, the costs of debt and equity rise, with the costs of debt rising
faster than equity. Consequently, highly redeployable assets should be
financed by debt whilst equity should be used for highly non-redeployable
assets. Williamson (1988) concluded that this argument was at odds with more
conventional corporate finance literature, as it suggests that debt is a neutral
financial instrument with equity being the instrument of last resort. However,
this conclusion was foreshadowed by the pecking order theory of Myers
(1984), and Myers and Majluf (1984), that we discuss in section 3.
Corporate strategy may also impact on capital structure. Strategy consists of
those actions and plans that influence the portfolio of activities in which the
firm is involved. It determines how assets are allocated and the level of debt
the firm carries. Most important, the goals of management strategy may
conflict with those of shareholders. The relationship between corporate
strategy and capital structure is less commonly examined in the mainstream
corporate finance literature. Nevertheless, five themes can be identified
within the literature that has appeared:
(i) The application of applied discounted cash flow techniques to the
development of value-based planning models; see Hax and Majluf (1984).
(ii) The relationships among the strategic decisions of a firm, stock market
performance and the level of systematic risk; see Chang and Thomas (1989).
16 Agency Theory and Capital Structure(iii) The dependence between stochastic inflation rates and the firm’s asset
structure, which reflects the firm’s strategic decisions; see Kracaw et al.
(1994).
(iv) The relationship between corporate strategy and the debt-equity ratio;
see Barton and Gordon (1987, 1988), Lowe et al. (1994) and
Krishnaswami, Spindt and Subramaniam (1999). It is argued that the
goals, risks, and strength of external monitoring influence the
firm’s capital structure. Specifically, firms which adopt single and
related strategies are the most conservative and are therefore most risk
averse while those having unrelated strategies are likely to be least risk
averse. This runs counter to standard diversification arguments, and
suggests that strategic “focus” implies a lesser willingness to take
risks.
(v) The relationship between the structure of the firm and the leverage
of the firm. Riahi-Belkaoui and Bannister (1994), amongst others,
assert that a change in a firm’s organisational structure will result in
a change in its capital structure. They argue that the adaptation
of a multi-divisional (“M-form”) corporate strategy is associated with
an increase in free cash flow. If so, and as noted above, the capital
market may force such firms to finance new capital by debt rather than
by equity in order to reduce management’s misuse of cash (Jensen
1986).
2.4 Conflict between equityholders and debtholders
Various underlying factors have been identified within the literature on the
conflict of interest between equityholders and debtholders. Smith and Warner
(1979) identify four major sources of conflict:
(i) Dividend payments: Here bonds are priced according to the level of
dividends paid by the firm. In the limit, a firm could sell all its assets and
pay a liquidating dividend to its shareholders with the bondholders being
left with valueless claims.
(ii) Claim dilution: Bonds are normally priced assuming that the firm will
not carry any more leverage. If the firm does issue additional debt, then
existing debt will fall in value if the newly issued debt has higher
priority. Even if it does not, existing debt will fall in value if the risk of
bankruptcy is perceived to have increased.
Agency Theory and Capital Structure 17(iii) Asset substitution: Bonds are priced in relation to the risk of the project
which is being financed. Thus, lenders’ claims are reduced if the firm
substitutes projects that increase the firm’s variance. This transfers
wealth from bondholders to shareholders.
(iv) Under-investment and mis-investment: Here, a firm in financial
difficulties has an incentive to reject low-risk, low (positive) net present
value projects whose benefits accrue mainly to bondholders, in favour of
high-risk, high net present value projects, thus creating under-
investment or misallocation of investment.
Myers (1977) argues that the greater is the proportion of growth assets in
a firm, the greater is the potential conflict of interest between stockholders
and bondholders, because the easier it is to alter a firm’s market value and risk
in such a way as to benefit stockholders at the expense of bondholders. To
minimize these conflicts, firms with high growth opportunities should have
higher leverage and use a greater amount of long-term debt than firms in more
mature industries. Alternatively, if capital market participants have rational
expectations and perfect information, they will anticipate these conflicts of
interest and counteract them by adjusting the price and conditions on
a firm’s bond. In fact, information in capital markets is far from perfect; and
the two main competing hypotheses concerning the impact on firm value of
bondholder-stockholder conflicts are built on the assumption of imperfect
information: the Irrelevance Hypothesis and the Costly Contracting
Hypothesis.
The Irrelevance Hypothesis predicts that the conflict of interest between
bondholders and stockholders does not change the value of the firm. Smith
and Warner (1979) argue that this is true, regardless of whether the
firm’s investments and therefore its cash flows are fixed. If investment is
fixed, debt covenants will only alter the distribution of payoffs between
bondholders and stockholders, but will not alter the overall value of the firm.
If the firm’s investment policy is not fixed, dividend payouts, asset
substitution and under-investment may cause changes in the investment
policies of the firm. In principle therefore, the value of the firm may change
if stockholders engage in activities that maximise their wealth at the expense
of bondholders. Galai and Masulis (1976) utilise an option model
7 to show
that a redistribution of wealth from bondholders to shareholders will result
18 Agency Theory and Capital Structure
7 The stock of a levered firm is analagous to a European call option on the firm’s cash
flows, with an excercise price equal to the face value of the debt.from any of: an increase in the risk of the firm, an increase in debt, or
a distribution (payout) of assets to shareholders. However, as Jensen and
Meckling (1976) observe, if investors are aware of the conflict between
stockholders and bondholders and discount any bonds which are issued,
stockholders will not gain from such actions since any ex-post transfers to
stockholders will be sub-optimal to the firm. Moreover, Galai and Masulis
(1976) argue that the problem of conflict can always be circumvented if
investors hold an equal proportion of their portfolio in equity and debt. Any
redistribution of income streams amongst different types of claim holders
would still leave each individual investor with unchanged wealth. There can
only be conflict if different agents hold debt and equity. See also Harris and
Raviv (1991) on this point.
The Costly Contracting Hypothesis predicts that the use of contracts to
control stockholder-bondholder conflicts of interest will increase the value
of the firm. By imposing restrictive covenants on debt, the value of the firm
will increase, for two reasons. First, the covenants reduce the costs which
debtholders incur if shareholders do not maximise the value of the firm.
Second, they reduce the monitoring costs of bondholders. This leads to
increased monitoring, improved management decisions, and hence an
increase in the value of the firm as a whole. However, restrictive covenants
involve costs, particularly the transactions costs of writing the contracts. In
principle therefore, the benefits of covenants can be traded against their
costs to arrive at a unique set of optimal contracts that will maximise the
value of the firm. In this setting, information asymmetry and monitoring
problems play an important role. See Krishnaswami, Spindt and
Subramaniam (1999).
Agency costs have several important implications for the features of debt
contracts. Green (1984) and Masulis (1988) argue that convertible debt will
have lower agency costs than plain debt. The conversion rights enable
bondholders to share in any positive wealth transfers to stockholders and to
gain from any increase in risk. Consequently, stockholders have fewer
opportunities to engage in those activities that would result in the increase of
stock values at the expense of bondholders. Thus, convertible debt tends to
moderate both shareholder-manager conflicts and shareholder-bondholder
conflicts. Such debt issues should therefore be less discounted than plain debt
issues. This conclusion is also supported by the work of Thatcher (1985), who
argues that the gain accruing to convertible bondholders from investments in
profitable low risk projects, which would otherwise be rejected by
shareholders, is reduced to the conversion premium, since bondholders have
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profits in these profitable low risk projects thereby reducing the agency
problem.
A potential problem with covenanted debt is that the partitioning of debt into
various separate classes with different rights creates a potential for new
conflicts of interest among the various classes of debtholders. According to
Masulis (1988), such conflicts are greatest during periods of financial
distress. Bulow and Shoven (1978) focus on conflicts of interest arising from
differences in the seniority and time priority of debt. When a firm has net
negative worth, shareholders will not buy additional stock to enable the firm
to avoid bankruptcy. However, short-term debtholders may extend additional
credit in exchange for a partial payment of their existing claims so that the
firm can avoid default (Hunsaker, 1999). This is beneficial to the firm since it
prevents immediate bankruptcy and allows short-term debt to be paid off,
thereby maintaining the time priority of short-term debt. On the other hand, if
bankruptcy was declared, the claims of long-term debt will be accelerated
which in turn may result in non-payment to short-term debtholders, if the
long-term claims are of senior or equal standing to the short-term debt claims.
Hart and Moore (1990) consider the relationship between the seniority of debt
and the firm’s capital structure
8. They show that either an increase in the
return on the firm’s initial dowry of assets or in the return on new assets will
be associated with an increase in the firm’s debt-equity ratio. Moreover, for
profitable investments, the debt-to-equity ratio falls as the variance of the
return on existing assets increases, but increases as the rate of return on debt
rises; but for unprofitable investments, the reverse is true. The opposite occurs
for the case where the investment is unprofitable. Given the multitude of
different bond covenants used in practise, it is not altogether surprising that
the theoretical literature has produced a host of special cases, but fewer
general conclusions about the implications of covenants. See Smith and
Warner (1979).
If debt covenants can be used to help resolve stockholder-bondholder
conflicts then, in principle, other forms of constraint may also work. Since
dividend payments are the main route by which stockholders divert cash from
bondholders, it is natural to consider constraints on dividend payments. Wald
(1999) develops a model in which conflict arises, not because of information
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8 Hart and Moore’s model has some parallels to that of Jensen (1986). However, Jensen
analyses the role of the firm’s financial structure in controlling funds out of the firm, whereas
Hart and Moore consider the role of the financial structure in controlling the funds into the
firm.asymmetries, but because of incomplete contracts: debt contracts cannot
cover all possible future contingencies. Wald shows that a dividend constraint
can solve the moral hazard problem that arises in the presence of incomplete
contracts. In this setting, more profitable firms that can afford higher
dividends will have lower debt-equity ratios so as to avoid hitting the
dividend constraint.
A further important issue in situations of conflict of interest and imperfect
information is that of managerial reputation. Diamond (1989) analyses the
influence of managerial reputation on reducing the problems of adverse
selection and moral hazard. A firm can invest in a safe asset, a risky asset, or
a combination of the two. Firms investing in a safe project will not default;
those investing in the risky project may default. Investors, ex-ante, cannot
distinguish between firms, consequently, the lending rate will reflect their
beliefs regarding the riskiness of a firm’s investment. Diamond assumes that
investors can only observe defaults. It follows that, the longer the period of
non-default, the better is a firm’s reputation as a safe firm, and the lower will
be its borrowing costs. This suggests that older firms will choose the safe
project to maintain reputation. Younger firms with a lesser reputation may
choose risky projects with higher prospective returns; but, if they survive,
they will eventually choose the safe project. Accordingly, older firms will
have lower levels of debt, ceteris paribus.
This analysis can be extended in terms of individual managerial reputations.
Hirshleifer and Thakor (1989) analyse the financial decisions of a firm in
which a manager may alter investment policy so that he/she can develop
a reputation for high ability. Thus, the manager is motivated by the
perceived value of her human capital. If the market for managerial labour
infers ability by the success or failure of projects, managers will chose those
projects that have the greatest probability of success even though they may
have poor or inadequate risk adjusted cash flows. This divergence of
interests between the manager and the shareholder, and the resulting moral
hazard, create managerial conservatism in project selection. Hirshleifer and
Thakor (1989) conclude that “for an unlevered firm, ceteris paribus,
managerial reputation building can cause excessive conservatism in
investment policy relative to the shareholders’ optimum”. This observation
suggests that the value of the firm is lower when such an outcome occurs
than in the case when it does not. However, agency costs between
shareholders and debtholders may be reduced as a result of management
being concerned about its reputation, because managers will chose the risky
projects. This results in lower rates of expropriation of debt by
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leverage increases, there is an increase in the value of the interest tax shield
of the debt, and the value of the firm rises.
9
Managerial reputation is one method by which management signals to
outsiders. If however, there is a high level of managerial share ownership,
reputation is less important. Under these circumstances, various conflicting
theories of the relationship between equityholders and debtholders have been
proposed. One line of argument draws on three basic points. First, firms with
high inside ownership may face high equity agency costs. Second, firms with
high inside ownership will face lower agency debt costs arising from the
lower divergence of managerial and shareholder interests. Third, firms with
high inside ownership may issue more debt than is optimal simply for the
insiders to maintain control of the firm. As Kim and Sorenson (1986)
conclude, these arguments all suggest that firms with high inside ownership
will issue more debt (and possibly excessive debt) than those in which
ownership is more dispersed. Grossman and Hart (1982) argue that managers
increase the level of debt so as to commit themselves to generating the
necessary cash flows to meet debt repayments and consequently reducing the
possibility of management engaging in excessive perquisites. This in turn
increases the value of the firm’s equity. Correspondingly, the costs of issuing
additional equity should fall as a result of external investors perceiving that
management have reduced their “shirking”.
10
However, other theories suggest that high levels of insider ownership will be
associated with lower levels of debt. For example, Jensen (1986) argues that
owner-managers will prefer lower debt levels so as to increase their discretion
over the use of free cash flow. Friend and Lang (1988) and Hunsaker (1999)
point out that lower debt levels will reduce the risk of bankruptcy, and
therefore help preserve the management’s stake in the firm. Thus owner-
managers will have a level of debt which is lower than optimal; and the
greater the concentration of management ownership the lower will be the
firm’s level of debt. A further consideration, due to Short and Keasey (1999),
is that well-diversified external shareholders would be willing to incur higher
debt levels than those which would rationally be sought by less diversified
risk-averse owner-managers.
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9 It is also worth noting that in levered firms, the pressure for reputation building and
managerial preservation may become so acute as to incline management to the rejection of any
slightly risky but profitable project; thus resulting in the value of the firm falling.
10 This argument is consistent with that of Ross (1977), as we explain in what follows.Notwithstanding the arguments of the previous two paragraphs, it can be
claimed that firms with a high degree of insider ownership would not, in fact,
suffer from equityholder-debtholder conflicts. It is natural to suppose that the
higher the proportion of shares owned by the management, the more difficult
it becomes for outsiders to discipline such owner-managers, without the aid
of high levels of debt. However, Grossman and Hart (1982) show that if we
start from a situation in which managers do not have any equity, then, as their
ownership increases, owner-managers’ and external shareholders’ interests
are increasingly tied together. The dispersion of external shareholders is also
important. For example, Zeckhauser and Pound (1990) and Chen and Steiner
(2000) argue that the presence of a few large external shareholders in a firm
may prevent owner-managers from adjusting debt ratios to suit their own
interests. Large external shareholders, by acting as monitors, help to lower
some of the agency problems of debt financing. Thus, such firms should have
a higher level of debt than those firms with no large external shareholders.
Alternatively, large external shareholders may act as a signal to the market
that managers are less able to engage in profit-reducing activities, thereby
mitigating the need for debt to be used as a signal of firm quality. As
a practical matter, these arguments obviously suggest important questions
about the role of investment funds in the monitoring process.
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the Capital Market
3.1 Introduction
It is generally thought that there are informational asymmetries between
borrowers and investors. When the firm issues a debt, it enters into a contract
with debtholders that by itself provides information, since the firm is a going
concern. Also, when management defaults on repayments, wide
dissemination of information is needed to placate investors. We follow and
draw on Harris and Raviv (1991) in picking three main theoretical strands of
literature on asymmetric information between the firm and the capital market:
the interaction of investment and capital structure; signalling with the
proportion of debt; and models based on marginal risk aversion.
3.2 The interaction of investment and capital structure
Myers and Majluf (MyM, 1984) is the seminal contribution to this literature,
11
which draws attention to the use of debt to avoid the inefficiencies in
a firm’s investment decisions which would otherwise result from information
asymmetries. The nature of the asymmetric information in this case is that
managers know more about their companies’ prospects, risks and values than
do outside investors. Asymmetric information leads to adverse selection and
moral hazard; in some respects, the problem is similar to the one originally
identified by Akerlof (1970) in that potential investors can purchase securities
which are “lemons”– a product whose quality cannot be ascertained by its
buyer. If there exists an asymmetry of information between investors and firm
insiders, then the firm’s equity may be under-priced by the market. This has the
effect of also under-pricing new equity which is used to finance new investment
projects. If management’s objective is to maximise the return to all
shareholders, the net effect is that new investors obtain a higher capitalised cash
flow from this investment than pre-existing shareholders, which may cause the
project not to be accepted on these grounds even when it has a positive NPV.
See Rock (1986) for a detailed analysis. In principle, the problem of under-
pricing of new equity could be solved by using financial securities that may not
be undervalued by the market, particularly internally generated funds. In
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11 Cleary (1999) is representative of some recent contributions.contrast to MM, this suggests that there will exist a specific hierarchy or
“pecking order” of securities to be used in the financing of projects.
Moreover, if the firm has financial “slack”, but asymmetric information
means that the market does not know this, managers will not issue fresh
equity, even though it may involve passing up a good investment opportunity,
so that the interests of present shareholders are protected. If investors
understand this point, then the market will assume that a decision not to issue
shares is “good” news. If management does propose a new share issue, it will
be interpreted as “bad” news, and the share issue will precipitate a fall in the
firm’s share price. MyM also show that if a firm can issue debt, it will do so
rather than issue equity, and this will result in the ex-ante value of the firm
being higher, since the loss in market value is reduced due to the reduction in
under-investment losses.
12
These results lead to the Pecking Order Hypothesis, which Myers (1984)
summarised in four parts:
(i) To finance new investment, firms prefer internal finance to external
finance. Asymmetric information creates the possibility that they may
choose not to issue new securities and therefore miss a positive NPV
investment; or may issue equity at a low price which disadvantages
existing shareholders.
(ii) Managers adapt their target dividend payout rates to their investment
opportunities, notwithstanding the downward inflexibility of dividends.
In setting the target payout rates, managers try to ensure that “normal”
investment plans can be met by internal finance.
(iii) If retained earnings are less than investment outlays, the firm first
depletes its financial “slack” (its cash balances or marketable securities).
If instead, retained earnings exceed investment, it first invests in cash or
marketable securities, and then pays off debt. If the firm is persistently
in surplus, it may increase its target payout rate.
(iv) If financial slack is depleted and a sufficiently favourable investment
opportunity is presented, the firm will resort to external finance. In this
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12 More recent work by Guariglia (1999) suggests also that there exists a strong linkage
between internal finance and inventory investment, especially work-in-progress and material
inventories.event, it starts with the safest security (plain debt); then hybrid securities
such as convertible bonds. As it climbs up the pecking order, a firm faces
increasing costs of financial distress inherent in the risk class of debt and
equity securities. Only when it runs out of debt capacity, and the
potential costs of financial distress become important, will it finally
resort to a new equity issue.
Thus, internal finance is at the top, and equity is at the bottom, of the pecking
order. Asingle “optimal” debt-equity ratio does not exist: a result which takes
us back to the original no-tax MM proposition I, but by a very different route.
The original MM propositions would suggest that firm financial policy is
irrelevant; and this is obviously not an implication of the Pecking Order
hypothesis.
Like the MM propositions, MyM’s Pecking Order hypothesis has generated
substantial debate. MyM’s model is not easily applied to new firms. This
omission was rectified by Narayanan (1988) who considers the information
asymmetries associated with assets-in-place. He also allows for the
possibility of risky debt. The conclusions of Narayanan’s model are that:
(i) the firm should issue less risky securities over more risky ones; (ii) debt
should be used in preference to equity; (iii) internal finance should be used in
preference to external finance; and (iv) if equity is used, the stock price falls
since the market views the firm as a “lemon”. Evidently, these conclusions are
consistent with MyM. However, when this model is extended, by Heinkel and
Zechner (1990), to allow the firm to choose an optimal capital structure
before its investment decision, it transpires that the use of debt or hybrid
securites, such as preferred stock, tends to cause under-investment. This
implies that the firm does once more have an optimal capital structure,
consisting of a mixture of debt and equity, a result that remains robust when
the analysis is extended to include corporate taxes.
Brennan and Kraus (1987) argue that MyM’s model only incorporates equity
and riskless debt. Since the pecking order theory relies in part on the costs of
distress and bankruptcy, this is potentially an inconsistency. They present
a counter-example to MyM, the essential ingredients of which are asymmetric
information, and the existence of a signalling equilibrium in which the market
will still under-price shares as lemons
13. In their model, if firms choose
a financing mix that minimises the cost of raising the required investment
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13 The concept of a signalling equilibrium is discussed in the section 3.3.funds, then, depending on the structure of the investment payoff function, it
is possible that investors can infer the main parameters of this function from
the financing mix chosen. This amounts to costless signalling of information
to the market. Less formally, it can be thought of as a (complex) form of
revealed preference. If the market can infer a firm’s financial position from its
observable financial policy, the firm cannot improve on the pricing of its
securities by changing that policy. It transpires that the cost-minimising
financial policy includes a share issue, and will often involve using part of the
proceeds of the issue to retire debt. Constantinides and Grundy (1989) show
that similar arguments are applicable to firms in which managers have an
equity stake. Such firms can invest in positive NPV projects by issuing
sufficient amounts of a hybrid security, such as convertible debt, so as to
undertake the projects and repurchase some of the firm’s existing equity.
Evidently, both these results contradict the pecking order prediction that
equity is the financing of last resort.
3.3 Signalling with the proportion of debt
This literature is concerned with the ability of firms to signal their true
financial position to outsiders, by the capital structure that they choose.
Typically, it is assumed that the investment opportunity is fixed. The seminal
contribution in this strand of literature is due to Ross (1977); more recent
contributions, such as Hunsaker (1999), link the role of debt to bankruptcy.
The basic model assumes two types of firm facing different, positive present
value, investment projects, one of which (A) is superior to the other (B).
A signalling equilibrium for these firms can be established using a particular
cut off value of debt as a signal of the firm’s type. If the actual value of debt
issued exceeds the cut-off value, the market perceives the firm to be of type
A(a high quality, high leverage firm); alternatively, if debt is less than the cut-
off value, the market perceives the firm to be of type B (low quality and
leverage). If a firm signals itself to be of type A, it must not issue more debt
than the net present value of the investment project for firm A, otherwise it
will go bankrupt. Similarly, if the firm is of type B, it must not issue more debt
than the net present value of the investment project for firm B. This
constitutes an equilibrium provided that each firm has no incentive to signal
incorrectly. If type A managers signal that they are of type B, they will issue
less debt, and therefore will not raise sufficient funds to finance type the
A investment project. Their compensation is therefore less than if they signal
correctly. If type B managers signal that they are of type A, then the amount
of debt issued is greater than the present value of the type B project, and
bankruptcy occurs. A type B manager will signal truthfully if the marginal
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firm signal truthfully, outsiders can infer the quality of the firm from its debt
level.
Ross’s model has three main empirical implications. First, in a recapitulation
of MM’s irrelevance theorem, the cost of capital is independent of the
financing decision of the firm, despite each firm having its own unique level
of debt. Second, the level of bankruptcy risk rises as the amount of debt issued
by the firm increases. Third, the value of the firm is positively related to its
debt-equity ratio: higher quality firms issue more debt.
A similar approach is used by Heinkel (1982), but with somewhat more
general assumptions. A key difference arises from the fact that Ross assumes
that management does not hold shares in the firm; management compensation
is determined by a contingent contract, related to the value of the firm.
Heinkel, on the other hand, considers the case of the owner-managed firm. As
before, a costless signalling equilibrium is one where the value-maximising
decisions of insiders determine the optimal level of debt to be issued. Heinkel
proves that the greater the quality of the firm, the lower the amount of debt
issued. For a low quality firm to misrepresent itself as high quality, it must
issue more “under-priced” debt and reduce the amount of its “over-priced”
equity. Similarly, for a high value firm to misrepresent itself as a low value
firm, it must issue less “over-priced” debt and more “under-priced” equity.
These actions by themselves are beneficial to outsiders but detrimental to
insiders in the firm. Thus, value-maximising insiders have no incentive to
signal incorrectly; and their financing decisions will support a costless, fully
revealing equilibrium. Heinkel’s model implies that high quality firms will
have low levels of debt. This is exactly the reverse of the result of Ross (1977)
that high quality firms have high levels of debt! Once again, this underlines
the point that, in recent models of capital structure, small changes in
assumptions can produce large changes in results.
Poitevin (1989) uses another model where debt is used as a signal. Here, there
is an incumbent firm and a new entrant; the financial structure of each firm is
endogenous. There are also two types of entrant firms: a low cost type and
a high cost type. In a separating equilibrium,
14 the entrant’s type can be
inferred by observing its financial policy. If financial policy is consistent with
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14 A separating equilibrium is one in which the two different firms can be correctly
identified by outsiders on the basis of the contracts offered by the respective firms. This
concept is due to Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976)a low-cost entrant, investors agree to finance it. If any other financial policy
is observed, the investors assume that the firm is a high-cost one and will not
finance its investment. The incumbent will finance using only equity that is
actuarially fairly priced (since his marginal cost and thus firm value is
known). The low-cost entrant will partially finance with debt. The level of
debt chosen is such that it would bankrupt the high-cost firm with certainty;
and it is this property of the financing decision which enables the low-cost
firm to signal itself truthfully as low-cost. The high-cost entrants cannot
masquerade as low-cost because the resulting high level of debt and
probability of bankruptcy, with its associated costs, will be too high.
Therefore, the advantage of debt is that the capital market places a higher
value on the debt-financed firm because it is perceived to be low-cost; the
disadvantage of debt is that it makes the entrant prone to be attacked by the
all-equity incumbent via a price war, threatening the entrant with bankruptcy.
The model suggests why younger firms may be more financially vulnerable
than established firms. Investors can assess the value of the incumbent and its
securities more easily than they can the entrant and its securities.
3.4 Models based on marginal risk aversion
Models based on marginal risk aversion invariably assume that there is
an owner-manager of the firm who is risk averse.
15 Therefore, the level
of debt that the firm incurs depends, in part, on the degree of risk-aversion
of the entrepreneur. The more risky a project, the smaller will be the
entrepreneur’s desired stake. In a seminal work, Leland and Pyle (1977)
consider an entrepreneur who wants to undertake an investment project
and plans to hold a certain fraction, a, of the firm’s equity. The remaining
equity is raised from outside lenders. As before, a signalling equilibrium
exists in which the entrepreneur’s ownership increases with the quality of
the firm, because the amount of equity retained by the entrepreneur is
interpreted by the market as a signal of quality. Since entrepreneurs are
known to be risk-averse, one who takes a high stake in a risky project must
be confident of its success. Entrepreneurs with inferior projects will not
choose a higher equity stake (to signal a higher quality firm), because it
would increase their exposure to the project’s idiosyncratic risk, and thus
reduce their utility.
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15 In most developing economies, owner-manager firms are predominant; almost all local
firms start as owner-managed and expand their businesses for later flotation on the stock
market. The firms are predominantly risk-averse, although Green, Lensink and Murinde (1999)
have found evidence to suggest that in Poland (as a transition economy) firms are risk-lovers.Leland and Pyle (1977) derive several implications from the signalling
equilibrium. First, it has the desirable property that a project will be
undertaken only if its true market value exceeds its cost. Second, the market
treats higher entrepreneurial ownership as a signal for a more favourable
project. Third, entrepreneurs make larger investments in their own projects
than would be the case if they could costlessly communicate their true
expected return. Thus, the entrepreneur suffers a welfare loss of investing
more than is optimal in a project, so as to communicate its worth. This may
cause some profitable projects to be rejected. Leland and Pyle suggest that
intermediaries which specialise in information-gathering and monitoring of
entrepreneurial projects could reduce this welfare loss by offering
entrepreneurs better terms of finance. Fourth, an increase in the specific risk
of the project, or the risk aversion of the entrepreneur, will reduce their
equilibrium stake in the project. Fifth, an increase in the specific risk of
a project will result in a greater expected utility for the entrepreneur.
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The theoretical literature has examined two main aspects of the impact of tax
on the firm’s capital structure. The first concentrates on aspects of the
corporate tax deductibility of debt, whilst the second looks at the way in
which taxes influence the decisions of the firm’s security holders, and hence
their willingness to hold the firm’s securities. Modigliani and Miller (1963)
recognised at an early stage that their perfect capital markets assumptions
need modifying to allow for corporate tax. In particular, debt typically offers
a tax shelter, because interest is deducted before taxable profits are struck.
Thus, in the presence of corporate taxes, MM showed that the value of the
firm as a whole rises as the level of leverage increases, suggesting that firms
have no constraint on the incentive to issue debt, other than the direct threat
of bankruptcy.
However, owners of debt and shares are also subject to tax on their security
income, and this affects their after-tax returns. King (1974, 1977) was among
the first to consider these issues more generally, and he pointed out that the
marginal tax rate applicable to securities depends both on the official tax rates
and on the precise system under which tax is collected. Under the classical
system operated in most countries, debt interest is a deductible expense for
firms, but is taxed as income in the hands of debtholders. Dividends on the
other hand are effectively taxed twice: once in the hands of the firm at the
corporate profits tax rate, and then a second time in the hands of shareholders
at the rate appropriate to dividend income, which may be different from the
rate applicable to interest or other income, and may differ among individual
recipients. Under the imputation system, the double-taxation of dividends is
partially relieved by an “imputation”: a tax credit which effectively enables
shareholders to credit the profits tax already paid by a firm to their own tax
liability on account of their dividend income from that same firm
16.
King (1977) examines the financing decisions of a firm whose objective is to
minimize the overall tax liability of its shareholders. This is a reasonable
objective in the world of MM, in which taxation is the only factor that can be
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16 Imputation systems typically involve some complexity in the exact manner in which the
imputation is calculated, and set against the firm’s profits tax on the one hand and the
individual’s dividend tax on the other. A detailed discussion of such systems is beyond the
scope of this survey. The United Kingdom operated an imputation system until 1999.used to distinguish among securities. To summarise his results, we define the
following:
z = the capital gains tax rate;
t = the corporate profits tax rate;
m = the marginal rate of income tax on unearned income.
Hence (1 – m) can be interpreted as the opportunity cost of retained earnings
in terms of net dividends forgone, and equals the additional potential
disposable income which shareholders could receive if one unit of retained
earnings were distributed. King distinguishes three cases, which, for
simplicity, we set out under the classical system with a common income tax
rate for interest and dividend income.
(i) If equity is given, and: (1 – m)/((1 – t)(1 – z)) > 1, the firm chooses to
finance with debt over retentions
(ii) If retentions are given, and: 1/(1 – t) >1, the firm chooses to finance with
debt over equity, a result which recapitulates that of Modigliani and
Miller (1963).
(iii) If debt is given, and: (1 – m + z) > 1, the firm chooses to finance with
equity over retentions
King’s analysis still suggests that, abstracting from other issues, exogenous tax
rates imply all-or-nothing financing decisions. In contrast, Miller (1977) argues
that marginal income tax rates are, in fact, heterogeneous, as shareholders
typically include a combination of taxable and tax-exempt entities. In
Miller’s view, the firm will issue debt until at the margin, the corporate tax
savings are equal to the personal tax loss, i.e., until the (marginal) corporate tax
rate is equal to the investor’s personal tax rate. Since these two rates cannot be
controlled by the firm, at equilibrium, the tax structure determines the aggregate
level of debt, but not the amount issued by a single firm. In this sense therefore,
Miller’s analysis implies that leverage is determinate, but still irrelevant for the
individual firm. However, it can still be argued that the marginal (personal)
lender faces an upward schedule of the return that is required for them to lend
an additional unit of funds, because of heterogeneous personal tax rates.
Likewise, any individual firm typically has pre-existing non-debt tax shields,
and will face an increasing probability of distress as debt increases. Thus, the
marginal (corporate) borrower will also face rising costs of debt, because the
value of the potential tax shield will tend to fall as leverage increases.
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tax equilibrium depends on there being institutional constraints on corporate
and individual behaviour, to rule out tax arbitrage for example. Moreover, the
nature of the equilibrium depends crucially on the exact nature of the
constraints. Small realistic changes in the constraints, allowing for different
kinds of tax-exempt institutions for example, can generate equilibria with
a distinct optimal debt-equity ratio for each firm. This argument was
developed by DeAngelo and Masulis (1980), who incorporate into the
analysis non-debt-tax-shields such as depreciation and investment tax credits.
Their results overturn Miller’s irrelevancy theorem without the need for
bankruptcy, agency, or any other leverage-related costs. They argue that firms
with large non-debt tax-shields relative to their cash flow will have less debt
in their capital structure, because the non-debt tax-sheltered expenditures
effectively exhaust the firm’s tax-saving capacity. There is a direct negative
relationship between the value of the marginal corporate tax saving and the
amount of debt issued: the higher is leverage, the higher is the probability that
the potential corporate tax shield from additional debt will be partially or
totally lost. The optimum level of debt occurs when the marginal corporate
tax benefit of debt is equal to its marginal personal tax disadvantage.
Subsequent contributions to this literature have continued to emphasise the
role of corporate taxes and constraints in supporting an interior optimum
capital structure, but extending the analysis to allow for the possibility of
bankruptcy.
17 This is sometimes called the Tax-Shelter-Bankruptcy-Cost
model. Kim (1978) applies mean-variance analysis to show that, when firms
are subject to taxes and to costly bankruptcies, corporate debt capacity occurs
at less than 100 percent debt financing. Brennan and Schwartz (1978) also
study the impact of corporate taxes and bankruptcy on the relationship
between capital structure and valuation. The issue of debt has two effects on
the value of the firm: first, it increases the tax savings as long as the firm
survives; but second, it reduces the probability of survival. Depending on
which is the stronger of the two, the value of the firm might rise or fall as
a result of a debt issue. The optimum value of debt is that at which the
marginal tax benefits associated with one extra unit of debt is equal to the
expected marginal cost of default (which rises as the firm’s gearing
increases). Among the predictions of this model are: first, that firm value
increases the most following a debt issue for firms that have the least business
risk; second, that, as the maturity of debt increases, the optimal leverage ratio
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17 We do not include in this review the numerous theoretical and empirical papers
concerned with the tax systems of particular countries.falls; and third that an increase in earnings risk also reduces the optimal
leverage ratio. Masulis (1988) notes, that within these models, debt is usually
subject to a higher personal tax rate than is equity, although the differential is
assumed to vary among investors. This implies that investors who currently
prefer equity must be persuaded to switch to debt by a price reduction. This
is an additional factor that diminishes the overall tax advantage of debt.
One immediate problem with theories of an optimal debt ratio based on
bankruptcy costs is that there is debate about the quantitative importance of
such costs. The seminal study by Warner (1977) of US railroad bankruptcies
found that the direct costs of bankruptcy were practically trivial. Altman
(1984) argued that once the indirect costs are taken into account, bankruptcy
costs are much larger, and certainly sufficient to influence firm behaviour. In
this respect, an important contribution of the Tax-Shelter-Bankruptcy-Cost
model is to establish that there is an interaction between the tax system and
financial distress. As Mayer (1986) points out, corporate tax payments are
non-negative: national tax authorities typically allow companies to carry
forward losses but not to claim immediate tax refunds on account of current
losses. Financially distressed firms encounter tax exhaustion well before they
are close to bankruptcy, and this imposes an immediate and significant cost
on the use of debt for such firms, independently of the immediate costs of
bankruptcy per se.
34 Theories of the Impact of Taxation on Capital Structure5. Univariate Empirical Research
A vast volume of work has empirically investigated the capital structures of
firms in the industrial economies. In recent years there have also been some
empirical studies of firms in developing economies. Most of these latter
studies aim at documenting basic facts about corporate financial structures in
developing economies, and are based on the analysis of financial ratios. They
may therefore be classified as univariate empirical studies. On its own, a set
of financial ratios does not necessarily provide much information;
accordingly, in this section, we emphasize inter-country comparisons among
industrial countries and between industrial and developing countries.
Moreover, since few specific hypotheses are tested in the papers under
review, we follow Mayer (1990), and classify the results in a set of
“observations”, each one representing a broadly acceptable stylized fact. In
making these observations, we begin by noting that commentators and
researchers usually distinguish between firms in “market-based” or “Anglo-
Saxon” financial systems (especially the US and UK) and those in more
“bank-based” or “European” systems (especially Germany and Japan). See
for example Mayer and Alexander (1990).
Observation 1: Regardless of whether de-facto market-based capital
structure behaviour is observed, retentions are the dominant source of finance
for firms in the main industrial countries.
This observation is drawn from our synthesis of the findings by Corbett and
Jenkinson (1994), Mayer (1988, 1990), Borio (1990) and Wright (1994).
Corbett and Jenkinson (CJ, 1994) examine corporate capital structures at the
aggregate level in Japan, Germany, the UK and US, for the period 1970-1989.
Internal funds were the main source of finance in all countries, with the UK
financing the highest proportion (97.3%) of its investment by retentions, and
Japan financing the lowest (69.3%). Similar results are reported by Mayer
(1988) for France, Japan, Germany, the UK and US for 1970–1985. The UK
was again the highest user of retentions (107%
18 of investment) while
Germany was the lowest with 67%. This finding is supported by Mayer
(1990), Murinde, Agung and Mullineux (1999), and Borio (1990). Moreover,
Wright (1994) finds that the level of retained earnings employed by non-
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18 This shows that retained earnings have been used to retire other sources of finance.North Sea Industrial and Commercial Companies in the UK has remained
essentially the same over the period 1982–1994.
Observation 2: Firms found in bank-based financial systems have higher
leverage than do firms in market-based ones.
Observation 2 is almost part of economic “folklore”, and it can be found in
the results of Borio (1990), Bisignano (1990) and many others. Borio’s study
of developed economy corporate capital structures finds that countries are
either “high leverage”, such as Japan, Germany, France and Italy, or “low
leverage”, such as Canada, the UK and US. A similar conclusion is drawn by
Bisignano (1990) who surveys the aggregate capital structures of Japanese,
German and US firms.
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However, there are, in fact, many qualifications to observation 2. First, it
depends on the precise definitions used in the calculation of leverage. Rajan
and Zingales (1995) observe that, if leverage is calculated as a ratio of debt to
total assets, all expressed at book value, then Canadian firms (at 36%) are the
most highly geared of the G-7 economies with German firms being the lowest
at 20% On this definition, the gearing levels of US and Japanese firms are
comparable at 35% and 31%, respectively. If however, leverage is calculated
as the ratio of debt to debt-plus-equity, all at market value, then UK and
German firms have the lowest gearing at 16%, with Italian companies having
the highest with 28%. CJ (1994) find that both British and American firms are
more highly geared than German firms if book values are used to calculate the
ratio of debt to debt-plus-equity. However, Rutterford (1985) estimates that
German firms have lower effective corporate tax rates, relative to their
nominal rates, than do firms in other countries. The value of the tax-shield
provided by debt is therefore lower, implying lower levels of leverage, ceteris
paribus.
Second, CJ (1994) note that, although US and UK firms are located in market-
based financial systems, the proportion of internal funds employed by US
firms increased from 74.5% in 1970 to 103.7% in 1989; and US and UK firms
both reduced their reliance on market-based sources of finance over this
period. They suggest that this was due to financial innovation over the period.
Bisignano (1990) also notes that US firms’ dependence on new equity issues
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19 Wensley and Walker (1995) note that Japanese firms carry more leverage than do New
Zealand firms.has fallen, especially during the 1980’s. However, he suggests that merger
activity may have been responsible for this development.
Third, Atkin and Glen (1992) report that, throughout the post-World War II
period, bonds constituted a significantly higher fraction of external finance
for US firms than did new equity. Moreover, loans (i.e. mortgages and
commercial paper), and trade credit, each separately provided more new
finance than did equity. Atkin and Glen’s data highlight some important
changes in the capital structures of US firms post-World War II: a decline in
equity and bank finance, and an increased use of directly-intermediated debt.
Fourth, the dependence of Japanese firms on debt is neither long-standing nor
necessarily persistent. Elston (1981) notes that, during the 1930’s, 60% of all
funds employed by Japanese firms were equity. This fell to 17% in the mid-
1970’s, compared to 40% for West Germany, 50% for the UK and 60% for the
US. More recently however, Japanese firms have relied less heavily on bank
debt and more on retained earnings and non-bank external sources. The
previously strong keiretsu bonds between affiliates have also become weaker
due to changes in banking law which forced bank portfolios to become more
diversified. This is generally reckoned to have increased the cost of debt, but
has also allowed firms to be freer to raise funds from equity. During the 1970s,
equity issued increased from 6% to 10% of total external finance, while bond
financing increased from 4% to 8% in the same period. Moreover, the
internationalisation of Japanese business, together with the increasing flow of
overseas investment, has given rise to a natural desire to raise funds from
abroad. This has been in the form of eurocurrency, national markets, or foreign
currency bonds. Atkin and Glen (1992) also find that the reduction in Japanese
leverage has been very marked in recent years, falling from 400% (of equity)
in 1977 to 100% in 1988. The authors assert that this decrease can be explained
by the liberalisation of the Japanese financial markets. In addition, during the
same period, share prices have steadily risen implying that the cost of equity
has fallen. In turn, this has caused a switch from debt to equity.
Bisignano (1990) notes several apparent differences in the financial
behaviour of firms that are all meant to be in bank-based financial systems. In
1965–1989 for example, the issues of securities and bonds by German firms
are small in comparison to both their Japanese and US counterparts,
a difference that cannot be explained by regulatory or other market
restrictions. Since the mid-1970’s, holdings of the German corporate sector
by banks have fallen, like they have in Japan; but, unlike Japan, bank lending
is still the dominant source of finance. Overall, it appears that Japanese firms,
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those of the US. See, for example, Rajan and Zingales (1995) and Borio
(1990). Indeed, there are similar patterns of corporate finance for firms found
within both the market-based and bank-based systems. For example, UK and
US firms have relied less on market sources of finance whilst those in
Germany have increased theirs. Of the four countries that were studied by CJ
(1994), Japan is the only one that relies more heavily on external rather than
internal sources. Likewise, Bertero (1997) notes that the French financial
system could be classified as a bank-based system, but there are still features
which are either unique to France, or more like other systems. Typically, the
French system was more of an overdraft system, like the UK, rather than
a German- or Japanese-type bank system. More recently, as in Japan, French
firms have increased their use of retained earnings at the expense of short-
term debt and have also increased their use of equity and bonds. Bertero
(1997) asserts that the latter has been as a result of increased capital market
efficiency caused by financial reform.
The “battle of the systems”, regarding the relative merits of bank-based and
market-based financial systems, is integral to the developing policy debate on
the evolution of financial systems in developing and transition economies.
See Murinde and Mullineux (1999). It is therefore important to observe at this
stage that, in the industrial countries, it can safely be concluded that many of
the stereotypes of firms found within either market-based or bank-based
financial systems have broken down, or perhaps never did exist in the precise
form that the “folklore” would have it. Firms in all countries are increasingly
influenced by the global capital market in which securities are traded and
international banks are active. But each country’s system of corporate finance
retains some of its own distinctive features, partly because of its historical
development, and partly because of current economic circumstances,
particularly the existing regulatory regime.
Observation 3: Firms located in developing economies rely less heavily on
internal finance than those found in developed economies.
Observation 3 was first suggested by Hamid and Singh (1992) who analyse
the corporate finance characteristics of the top 50 manufacturing firms in:
India, Thailand, Jordan, Malaysia, Taiwan, Mexico, Pakistan, Zimbabwe and
South Korea over the period 1980–1987. They find that firms in developing
countries used less internal finance than their developed economy
counterparts. They attribute this to different growth rates, and to lower
retention ratios, rather than, for example, to the distorting influences of
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economies. Atkin and Glen (1992), and Singh (1995) reach similar
conclusions. As with firms found within the developed economies, the use of
internal sources of finance does vary across developing countries. Atkin and
Glen (1992) survey macro-economic data on the corporate sector in several
developing economies (Zimbabwe, Pakistan, Malaysia, India and South
Korea), and find that Zimbabwean and Pakistani firms rely most heavily on
internal finance: 58.5% and 58.3% respectively of all sources, whilst South
Korean firms were least dependent with 12.8%. See also Guariglia (1999).
They argued that, as South Korea has a more advanced financial system, it
provides a greater number of external financing options for investment
projects; and, indeed, South Korean firms do use a greater amount of external
finance, both equity and long-term debt, than do Pakistani firms. Cobham and
Subramaniam (CS, 1998) find that Indian firms use rather more equity and
less retained earnings than do their UK counterparts.
Observation 4: Equity and debt are equally important as the major source of
firm finance in developing countries, although one is more important in some
countries and the other is more important elsewhere.
Hamid and Singh (1992) and Singh (1995) find that firms found within
developing economies rely more heavily on equity than on debt to finance
growth relative to their counterparts in the developed economies. A reverse
pecking order is observed. Singh (1995) argues that the dependence of firms
in developing economies on capital markets is due to: (i) active government
sponsorship, such as privatisation, and specific policies that encourage the
demand and supply of funds; (ii) financial liberalisation which has resulted in
higher real interest rates and therefore reduced demand for bank finance; and
(iii) rising price-earnings ratios that have reduced the cost of equity capital. CS
(1998) note that these conclusions are puzzling, given the developing
countries’ lax accounting and auditing protocols, which increase information
imperfections, their less well-defined property rights, and small and inefficient
capital markets. Taken together, these factors suggest that firms will use bank-
based finance rather than the capital markets. CS (1998) argue that the studies
of Hamid and Singh (1992) and Singh (1995) suffer from small-sample bias.
To correct for this, CS conduct a micro-study using two data sets for India: the
ICICI (composed of 1013 firms for 1980-1992) and the RBI (containing 1650
firms for 1975–1990), and one for the UK (Business Monitor consisting of
2000 firms for the period 1982–1990). It was found that the behaviour of large
Indian and UK firms were the same in terms of borrowing through the issue of
bonds; however, from the ICICI sample, a negative dependence was noted
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to smaller firms having lower agency costs since the firms will most likely
issue new equity to existing shareholders/directors who are already familiar
with the firm rather than to the public directly.
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Observation 5: Firms in developing economies may use more or less debt
than those in developed countries.
Here we cite the differences found by two different sets of studies as evidence
for this observation. Hamid and Singh (1992) together with Singh (1995) note
that companies found within Jordan, Malaysia, Taiwan, Mexico, Pakistan and
Zimbabwe have gearing levels that are similar to those of firms in developed
economies, whereas firms in Thailand and South Korea have higher levels.
The studies also note that Indian firms have gearing levels that are similar to
those of companies found within developed countries. CS (1998) find the
opposite: Indian firms employ more bank-based and bond finance than their
UK counterparts. However, they also find that the gearing levels of the largest
Indian firms are broadly similar to those of their larger UK peers.
Although we have set out five more or less consensual observations, it will be
clear that, overall, it is difficult to generalize about corporate capital
structures: either within the industrial countries, or within the developing
countries, or in comparisons between the two. Depending on the country, the
time period, and the data definitions, different studies come to different
conclusions. This suggests that the root of the differences in corporate capital
structures may lie in the different underlying circumstances faced by
individual firms. If firms in the same country all faced exactly the same
circumstances and constraints, we would expect to see greater uniformity of
results within individual countries. It would appear particularly important
therefore to survey the various tests of theories of corporate capital structure,
as these theories seek the source of cross-sectional differences among firms
in more fundamental differences of circumstance among individual firms:
their industry, shareholders, bondholders, managements, and workforce. We
therefore turn next to the multivariate research results.
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20 Indeed, this suggests that there is a large degree of intra-country differences in capital
structures. This (i) concurs with the observation made by Mayer and Alexander (1990) who
find intra-country differences in the capital structures of German and UK firms; and (ii) the
major disadvantage of using flow-of-funds data when making any comparisons since
a potentially large amount of information is not captured by the data. Also, and unlike the
majority of ratio studies, CS use aggregate flow-of-funds data against company accounts. This
could also explain the difference between CS’ and Hamid and Singh’s findings.6. Multivariate Empirical Research: Methodologies
Various methodologies have been employed in multivariate empirical
research on capital structure. These methodologies are mainly based on the
use of ordinary least squares regressions to analyse cross-sections of company
data. Linear structural modelling has also been employed. See Jöreskog and
Sörbom (1981) for an exposition of this technique. Company data are usually
taken from the published accounts of individual companies and related
sources. Company accounts data are widely available from the websites of
individual firms, or from specialist information companies. In the last 15
years, greater emphasis has been placed on panel data studies. Here, a cross-
section of companies is tracked through time, typically for between 5–10
years. In panel studies, the same companies may be studied over time, or the
list of companies may vary. Clearly an advantage of panel data is that they
offer substantially more observations, and the time dimension allows for
easier testing of a wider range of hypotheses than is possible with a single
year’s cross-section. However, the use of panel data does pose new
econometric problems; see, for example, Hsiao (1986). For a more extensive
summary of some of the main methodological issues involved in multivariate
research on capital structure the reader is referred to appendix 2 of this paper.
Here, to avoid disruption of the main purpose of the survey, we turn directly
to a review of the results of the multivariate empirical research.
417. Multivariate Empirical Research: Main Empirical
Findings
In this section, we discuss the empirical findings which relate to key leading
issues, specifically: the impact on corporate capital structures of ownership
and control structures, bankruptcy costs, and corporate strategy; as well as
testing of the pecking order hypothesis.
7.1 Ownership and control structures and the financial structure
of the firm.
The empirical literature on ownership and control is conveniently divided into
two themes. The first examines the influence of ownership structure on the
dividend policies of the firm. The second investigates the impact of
management shareholdings on the firm’s debt ratio. Although clearly relevant
to capital structure, dividend policy is a major subject in its own right and the
literature on this topic is well surveyed by Short (1994). Accordingly, in this
section we concentrate on the impact of management shareholdings on debt
ratios. The main studies in this area are summarised in Table (1).
Zeckhauser and Pound (1990) test whether large shareholders improve
corporate performance by encouraging performance-tilting, the practice
which arises under asymmetric information between shareholders and
managers and results in improvements of corporate performance without the
diminution of managerial effort or of excess pay. This is because large
shareholders can exploit economies of scale in information costs, which
reduces the agency (monitoring) costs of debt. If true, this implies that the
leverage of firms with at least one large shareholder should be higher than that
of a firm that does not have a large shareholder. In fact, Zeckhauser and
Pound (1990) find that there is no significant difference in leverage ratios
between such groups of firms. They conclude that large shareholders appear
to perform a monitoring function only for equity owners and do not have
a positive impact on debtholders.
Friend and Hasbrouck’s (1988) study differs from Zeckhauser and Pound in
terms of investigating whether there is a systematic relationship between
insider (manager) holdings and debt. Two proxies are used here: the first is
a fractional ownership variable, the largest fraction of shares that is held by
an insider, whilst the second is an absolute variable, the market value of
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Table 1 (continued): The Influence of Ownership and Control on Capital Structureequity held by the largest insider. A priori, there could be either a negative or
positive relationship between debt and insider holdings: negative, if the rise
in bankruptcy costs for insiders outweigh the reduction in their agency costs;
positive, if the reverse is true. Friend and Hasbrouck find that, when both the
fractional and absolute insider holdings are included, the former becomes
positive and significant whilst the latter becomes more negative. In addition,
the explanatory power of the fractional variable dominates that of the
absolute. These results provide some weak support for the hypothesis that
insider ownership does reduce the agency cost of debt. However, in these
regressions, it should be noted that causality runs from the insider holding
measure to the debt ratio. Friend and Hasbrouck suggest that a reverse
causality may also occur: a high level of debt increases the risk of firm stock,
and tends to drive out outside shareholders.
Friend and Lang (1988) extend the empirical work of Friend and Hasbrouck
in two ways. First, the sample of firms is divided into two equal sized groups:
closely held companies (CHCs) where the dominant insider shareholders hold
more than 13.825 percent of overall equity, and publicly held corporations
(PHCs) where managers hold less than 13.825 percent. Second, Friend and
Lang argue that those firms who have dominant insider equityholders will
have less debt than those companies who do not. Consequently, CHCs should
have lower debt levels than PHCs. Moreover, if there are economies of scale
in information gathering, those firms that have large external shareholders
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Notes: The results, methodologies and layout of some authors are drawn from Short (1994).may monitor the behaviour of managers more effectively than those
corporations who do not. Therefore, each category of firms was sub-divided
into two further groups: CHC0 and CHC1, which represent closely held
corporations with and without non-managerial principal investors; and PHC0
and PHC1, representing publicly held corporations with and without non-
managerial principal investors. Friend and Lang also include an additional
explanatory variable in their model: the fraction of equity held by dominant
non-managerial stockholders who are not either an officer or director but hold
more than ten percent of outstanding shares (FRO). Finally, and in order to
reduce heteroskedasticity, they used the log of a firm’s market value (LMV)
as an explanatory variable instead of its market value (MV). Otherwise,
Friend and Lang used essentially the same methods as Friend and Hasbrouck.
When used with the other explanatory variables, including LMV, the
coefficient for FRO was positive and statistically significant in each of the
CHC0, CHC1, PHC0 and PHC1 sub-samples. The last result was contrary to
a priori expectations. However, when LMV was excluded, the coefficients
were still statistically significant but changed sign from positive to negative
in all sub-samples. Thus, LMV dominates FRO implying, as in Friend and
Hasbrouck, that management uses the market value of equity to determine
debt levels.
Another study that tests the influence of insider equity holders on firm
leverage is that of Kim and Sorensen (1986). Here the authors test whether
the cross-sectional variation in corporate leverage ratios can be related to
agency costs. Firms were classified into three groups: heavy, average, and low
inside ownership. Unlike Friend and Lang’s classification, insider ownership
is defined here as insiders owning more than 25% of the outstanding equity
of the firm. The sample of low or “diffuse” insider ownership firms consisted
of those in which less than 5% of the outstanding equity is held by insiders.
The third sample of (168) average inside-ownership firms consisted of those
with 50% insider ownership and 50% diffuse ownership. Debt was defined as
the ratio of long-term debt to total capitalisation using book value. Analysis
of variance and ordinary least squares regression techniques were utilised.
Here, it transpires that insider firms have between 6 to 7 percent higher debt-
to-total capitalisation ratios than diffuse ownership firms in the same industry.
This suggests that large firms who are heavily owned by insiders tend to
finance projects with greater amounts of long-term debt. This can be
explained by three observations. First, insiders may have sold debt so as to
maintain control of their firm. Second, due to high agency costs of equity,
firms with high insider ownership would issue debt to avoid costs of external
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insider ownership have lower agency costs on the grounds that (i) standard
debt provisions and covenants may be more effective when there is a close
control of ownership; and (ii) if a large proportion of inside ownership
indicates that the problem of sub-optimal investment is likely to occur thereby
implying lower agency costs.
Firth (1995) considers the impact of institutional shareholders and
management interest on the firm’s capital structure. Firth’s study
differentiates itself from those of Friend and Lang (1988) and Friend and
Hasbrouck (1988) by using the whole of the sample data with managerial
shareholder ownership expressed as a continuous variable instead of
classifying firms into groups according to whether they had either above or
below median managerial share holdings. Firth tested to see if: first, there is
a negative relationship between executive share holdings (FMS) and the
firm’s debt-equity ratio; and second, if there is a positive dependence between
the level of institutional shareholdings (LVMS) and the firm’s debt-equity
ratio. The former hypothesis represents the human-capital motivation while
the latter is an implication of the usual firm value maximising arguments. On
the whole, Firth (1995) concludes that there is sufficient empirical evidence
to support either hypothesis. The capital structure of the firm is dependent
upon the relative influence and power of substantial institutional
shareholders.
Hussain (1995) extends the analysis to developing economy firms in
Indonesia. His analysis recognises the observation by Whitley (1992) that
many firms within developing economies can be characterised as being
family owned or controlled. Hussain (1995) essentially tests whether the
influx of foreign capital has altered the firm’s capital structure via the
proportion of shares held by these families. The main finding was that the
inflow of foreign capital, which has reduced the concentration of family
ownership, has resulted in the gearing of the firm falling. This is consistent
with the findings for firms found in developed economies.
Two other points emerge from the studies summarised in table 1. The first
relates to the impact of managerial ownership in the context of agency
conflicts. Using par values to measure firms’capital, Chen and Steiner (2000)
find a clear positive relationship between managerial ownership and leverage.
This provides evidence against the hypothesis that management prefers to
reduce the risk associated with their individual portfolios in the firm: instead
of reducing leverage, they actually “gear up”. However, as noted by Firth
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relationship between the proportion of the market value of the shares held by
management and the firm’s gearing level. This latter result is more consistent
with the predictions of theory, which would suggest that managements are
influenced by the current values of their undiversified portfolios to spread
risk: one method of avoiding increased risk is to maintain low capital gearing.
Therefore, a possible interpretation of these results is that managements are
more concerned with the market value of their holdings than with their
absolute proportions. The second issue that table 1 highlights is the role of
shareholder concentration on the firm’s capital structure. It is argued that
external shareholders, who are thought to be well diversified, would prefer
the firm to attain its optimal debt level and therefore have a higher level of
leverage than that sought by the firm’s management. However, in the
presence of large shareholders, monitoring costs should be lower which
reduces the cost of debt and therefore increases leverage. The empirical
evidence here appears to be unambiguous: Amihud et al. (1990), Zeckhauser
and Pound (1990), and Hussain (1995) all find a negative relationship
between large shareholders and firm leverage. Thus, there is clear support for
the hypothesis that the presence of large shareholders reduces the agency
costs of debt that in turn increases a firm’s gearing.
7.2 The influence of bankruptcy costs on the firm’s capital structure
In the majority of existing empirical studies, the impact of bankruptcy costs
on the firm’s financial structure is investigated directly.
21 For example, Ang,
Chua, and McConnell (Ang et al. 1982) examine if there is a relationship
between bankruptcy costs and the capital structure of the firm. Three types of
costs are associated with bankruptcy: first, administrative expenses paid to
various third parties involved in the bankruptcy proceedings; second, the
indirect costs of re-organisation and the shortfall in realised value when assets
are liquidated; and third, the loss of tax credits when the firm goes bankrupt.
Haugen and Senbet (1978), Miller (1977) and Warner (1977) argue that the
last two costs are the most relevant ones when a decision about the liquidation
of the firm is about to be done. Such costs would be borne by the security
holders of the firm regardless of how much equity and debt the firm carries
and are irrelevant to the firm’s capital structure. Given this, Ang et al.’s paper
studies the direct administrative costs of corporate bankruptcy, concentrating
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21 This approach should not be confused with the impact of the likelihood of the firm
becoming bankrupt (examined normally via a risk measure), which is reviewed later in this
paper.in particular on the possible scale effects of such costs. Warner (1977) argues
that such costs are a concave function of the market value of the firm at the
time of bankruptcy. Accordingly, Ang et al. estimate two equations
22, one with
a quadratic functional form:
B=b 0 +b 1 A+b 2 A
2 (1)
and the other with a logarithmic form:
log B = a0 +a 1 ln A (2)
Here, B is the cash amount of administrative expenses, and A is the liquidating
value of the firm, including funds used to pay for the
administrator’s expenses. Necessary conditions for concavity are that: b0 =0 ,
b1 >0 ,and b2 <0in (6), or that: a0 =0 , and 0<a 1 <1 in (7). Ang et al. found
that all the bi coefficients were significant and had correct sign. For the
logarithmic function, a0 was statistically insignificant whilst a1 was
significant and fell within the predicted interval. Thus, they concluded that
administrative expenses are a concave function of the market value of the
firm. The results imply that estimated bankruptcy costs are 2% of the
firm’s liquidating value if the firm’s value is in excess of US$1m. However,
it should be noted that these results are based on a restricted sample of small
companies located within a specific geographical region (Western District of
Oklahoma), and may not be representative of US firms in general.
Asimilar model to Warner’s (1977) is applied by Bradbury and Lloyd (1994).
The authors provide estimates of the direct costs of bankruptcy in New
Zealand via an analysis of 27 corporate receiverships for the period 1980
through 1987. In relation to previous bankruptcy studies, Bradbury and Lloyd
innovate by estimating how sensitive bankruptcy costs are to various
measures of firm size as well as estimating two non-linear functions relating
bankruptcy administration costs to firm size:
log AC= a0 +a 1ln RP (3)
AC = b0 +b 1RP
2 (4)
In these equations, AC is the administration costs, RP is receivership
proceeds, and the hypotheses are: a0,b 0 >0and  0<a1<1 with  b1 >0 .
Bradbury and Lloyd find that a0 is significant, indicating that there are fixed
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22 The estimation procedure is ordinary least squares.costs associated with bankruptcy. However, this conclusion cannot be made
for the quadratic model since b0 is found to be insignificant. In sum, it was
concluded that the administration costs are a concave function of the
firm’s liquidation value, a finding that is consistent with previous studies.
However, one deficiency of this study lies with the exclusion of indirect
bankruptcy costs. These could not be modelled due to lack of data.
Altman (1984) investigates the impact of both direct and indirect
bankruptcy costs as well as the likelihood of bankruptcy for a sample of 12
US retailers (1970–1978) and 7 industrial bankruptcies (1975–1978).
Indirect costs are measured in terms of forgone sales and profits. That is, the
difference between actual and estimated profits was applied. For both
industrial and retailing firms, it was found that, in general, there was
a marked decrease in the value of the firm in the period prior to bankruptcy,
a decrease that was especially acute for industrial corporations. Marked
increases in the costs of individual firms were observed, with the greatest
increases occurring in the period immediately prior to bankruptcy. Thus, for
both types of firms, bankruptcy costs cannot be treated as trivial.
Interestingly, it was noted that the likelihood of a firm entering bankruptcy
was correctly interpreted by security analysts who discounted the market
value of the firm up to three periods prior to bankruptcy. Chen and Merville
(1999) also find that the indirect costs of financial distress may be
considerable. In a sample of 1041 US firms covering 1982–92, they find
that the annual average loss per firm due to financial distress was 10.3% of
market value, per annum. This estimate is substantially larger than most
previous estimates mainly because Chen and Merville include the cost of
lost investment opportunities. Firms in distress are constrained in their
ability to finance new investments for the reasons discussed in previous
sections, particularly the concerns of debtholders that the firm may not
survive to realise the rewards of a potentially profitable investment
opportunity; and this effect turns out to be particularly important in Chen
and Merville’s results.
Table 2 summaries the main findings of these bankruptcy studies. A number
of observations can be made; these include: (i) heterogeneity in terms of
measuring firm size; (ii) bankruptcy costs seem to be non-linearly related to
firm size with the mean costs ranging from 2.1% to 38.8% of firm value; (iii)
numerous studies have shown that liquidation costs are represented by
transfer of control and are thus independent of the costs relating to the
borrowing decision. See in particular Haugen and Senbert (1978) and Ang et
al. (1982); (iv) for those studies that report relative bankruptcy costs as a ratio
50 Multivariate Empirical Research: Main Empirical Findingsof firm value in years prior to bankruptcy, it is clear that bankruptcy costs are
highest during the year of bankruptcy.
7.3 The impact of corporate strategy on the firm’s capital structure
Whitley (1992) observes that developing economy firms follow corporate
structures that are similar to those of conglomerates. This suggests that the
issue of the relationship between a firm’s strategy and its capital structure has
special relevance to any study examining the financial behaviour of firms in
a developing economy. The empirical literature on these issues can be divided
into two groups. The first examines the direct impact of diversification
strategies on capital structure while the second explores the influence of firm-
specific assets on capital structure.
23
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Table 2: The Influence of Bankruptcy Costs per se on Capital Structure (Section 7.2)
Notes: 1. t= time relative to year of bankruptcy: 0 = year of bankruptcy; -n = n number of
years prior to bankruptcy.
23 The latter can be indirectly examined via the impact of tangibility on the demand for
debt. This issue, along with other hypotheses that are simultaneously tested within previous
research, will be reviewed later in this paper. What follows considers only the former strand of
work.Formal econometric testing of the impact of corporate strategy on the
firm’s capital structure was started by Barton and Gordon, (BG, 1988).
Strategy is a proxy for management values, goals and motivations for firm
diversification. It must therefore also include managers’ preference for debt
and equity. A central issue here is the impact of diversification on risk, which
in turn influences the firm’s gearing. Thus, firm strategies which involve
diversification into unrelated activities have the lowest risk associated with
them since there is no order to the process of diversification, ceteris paribus;
the reverse is true for firm strategies which involve diversification into related
activities. Accordingly, management strategy impacts on the firm’s financial
structure. A sample of 279 Fortune-500 US industrial firms covering the
period 1970–1974 was divided into four groups: single strategy, dominant
strategy, related strategy and unrelated strategy. Several results emerged from
this research. First, overall, there was sufficient statistical evidence for not
rejecting the hypothesis that corporate strategy does influence the capital
structure decisions of the firm. In relation to single strategy firms, it was
found that the average debt level was significantly lower than all other
categories. However, there was no significant difference between the average
debt level of firms following dominant strategies and the overall average debt
level of the sample as a whole. The average debt level of firms that adopted
a related corporate strategy was lower than that for firms in the unrelated
category. Finally, firms with an unrelated strategy had the highest debt ratios
of all. Moreover, such debt levels were significantly higher than those for
single and related category firms.
Lowe et al. (1994) extend BG’s work by investigating whether the corporate
strategy of the firm influences its capital structure in a sample of Australian
public companies for the period 1984 to 1988. The sample was divided into
the same four groups used by BG. This procedure initially gave results that
were mostly insignificant. However, by pooling the data and using dummy
variables to differentiate the effects of each type of strategy in the whole
sample, more efficient estimates were obtained. Lowe et al. report that the
gearing of firms which adopt either a single-firm, a dominant-firm or
a related-firm strategy is not affected by that strategy, but the gearing of firms
which adopt an unrelated strategy is affected by the strategy. These are clearly
not the same as BG’s results. Riahi-Belkaoui and Bannister (1994) also
consider the impact of corporate strategy on the financial structure of the firm.
They conduct a longitudinal study to capture the effects of the implementation
of a decentralised M-form (multi-divisional) organisation structure on the
firm’s capital structure. Data for a period of 5 years before and 5 years after
the point of restructuring was collected from COMPUSTAT and
52 Multivariate Empirical Research: Main Empirical FindingsMOODY’s Industrials Manual for 62 firms. Covariates of firm size, growth
in total assets and growth in GNP are used as control factors for the early/late
adaptation of M-form structures. This is motivated by the belief that late
adapters learn from the experience of early movers and thereby restructure
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Table 3: Corporate Strategy and Capital Structure (Section 7.3)faster and more efficiently. An analysis of covariance is used to test the
overall relationship between the organisation structure and capital structure.
The results indicate that those firms that adopt a change in structure to form
a multidivisional organisation are associated with a shift in capital structure
and a significant increase in long-term debt in comparison with those with an
hierarchical structure.
All the work reviewed so far has concentrated on large firms. Jordan et al.
(1998) extended the analysis by examining the role of strategy in smaller UK
firms. The influence of strategy should be different from that in large firms,
since the ownership and risk characteristics of small firms are distinct from
those of large firms. The role of competition is thought to be more eminent
than that for corporate strategy in determining the demand for funds by
smaller firms. Jordan et al. effectively test for the impact of both competitive
and corporate strategies. Using a sample of 275 small UK firms for the period
1983–1993, which (as with BG and Lowe et al.) was split according to
whether the firm adopted either a corporate or a competitive strategy. In
relation to the former, it was found that corporate strategy per se did not
influence smaller firm’s capital structure. However, when the same analysis
was applied to firms that used competitive strategies, it was found that
competitive strategy did influence capital structure.
Table 3 summaries the main findings of these studies. It seems clear that
strategy does influence the firm’s capital structure, but further research is
required to identify the precise channels through which this influence is felt,
as the results of the main studies do not offer a clear consensus on this point.
7.4 Testing the Pecking Order Hypothesis
According to the Pecking Order hypothesis, information asymmetries
between the firm and the market imply that firms prefer to finance using
retained earnings, followed by debt, and finally by equity. There are two main
ways in which the pecking order hypothesis is tested within the literature. The
first is by examining the impact of profitability on the firm’s leverage. Here
a negative dependence suggests that the firm will, for a given level of
dividends, prefer to use retained earnings over leverage and so adhere to the
pecking order hypothesis. However, this approach does not specifically test
for the pecking-order hypothesis in isolation since the influence of a number
of other capital structure determinants is simultaneously investigated. The
second approach involves specifically testing for the pecking order
hypothesis. In this approach, there are two further ways of proceeding, and
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conducting interview or survey research. Interview research is a large subject
in its own right with specific methodologies attached. Accordingly, in this
paper, we concentrate on the modelling approach to corporate capital
structure. See Ang and Jung, (1993) and De Haan et al. (1994) for discussion
of the interview/survey approach.
Klein and Belt (1994) apply Logit regression analysis to test the likelihood that
a firm will choose internal over external sources of finance, and to model the
probability of choosing between debt and equity. This study was carried out for
all non-financial and non-regulated firms in the US for the period 1983–1988.
In relation to whether the firm chooses between internal and external
financing, it was found that faster growing and more operationally efficient
firms would employ external over internal sources of finance. Also, the greater
the information asymmetry between the firm and the capital market, the lower
the likelihood of using external sources of finance (Krishnaswami, Spindt and
Subramaniam, 1999). In relation to the preference of debt over equity, it was
found that the most efficient firms prefer to use debt. Such a preference rises
in the presence of increasing information asymmetries. Both of these results
effectively provide more support for the pecking order hypothesis. However,
Marsh (1982) uses the same general Logit model approach, but finds that the
deviation of the current debt ratio from the firm’s target debt ratio helps
explain the probability of debt and equity issues. This would suggest that firms
are adjusting towards a target capital structure, an hypothesis that is not
consistent with the pecking order model.
Like Klein and Belt (1994), Baskin (1989) examines whether US firms adhere
to the traditional pecking order hypothesis. A structural model is constructed
for 378 firms for 1972. Unlike previous models, Baskin (1989) argues that the
existence of a pecking order is, in part, due to the stickiness of dividend
payments that restrict the free use of retained earnings. Dividend stickiness is
a central hypothesis of the original Lintner model (Lintner, 1956). In this
model, the past level of dividends influences current dividends, so that high
past dividends increase the expectation of larger future ones. In turn, this
increases the demand for free cash flow and therefore increases the demand
for debt, ceteris paribus. Baskin (1989) finds support for Lintner’s argument
and for a pecking order: the payment of high levels of past dividends
statistically increases the demand for leverage; dividend payments are sticky;
and the demand for debt is significantly negatively related to past
profitability. Overall, this provides interesting support for the traditional
pecking order hypothesis in the context of the Lintner dividend model.
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hypothesis via the impact of past returns and growth on firm leverage. The
following equation was estimated using a sample of 89 industrial and
commercial firms for the period 1954 to 1982:
NDARjt =a 1 +a 2 ROAj,t +a 3 ROAj t–1 +a 4 ROAj,t–2
+a 5 ROAj t–3 +a 6GROWTHj,t +e j,t
(5)
where  NDARj,t = the leverage ratio; GROWTH is the growth in the
firm’s assets and defined as the ratio of the firm’s total assets at the beginning
of the sample period to total assets at the end of the sample period; ROAj,t–i is
the return on total assets before interest and taxation for period t–i, and is
intended to capture the firm’s past profitability. Firms within the banking,
finance and mining sectors were excluded on the grounds that their particular
activities influence their capital structure in a manner that would make it the
tests more difficult to interpret. The reported regression results show
a significant negative relationship between past profitability and debt ratios
which rejects the static optimal capital structure model and provides support
for the pecking-order hypothesis.
Chua and Woodward (1993) add an interesting twist and assert that if the
pecking order hypothesis is correct, then there should be a negative
relationship between liquidity and internally generated cashflows with
leverage. Leverage is regressed against internally generated cash flows,
external funds required and liquidity for a sample of 43 private Canadian
firms for the period 1983 to 1988. It is found that there was a negative
dependence between liquidity and internally generated funds; accordingly,
support is given to the pecking order hypothesis.
Claggett (1991) also addresses whether there is support for the pecking order
hypothesis by examining two competing theories relating to capital structure
of the firm within a sample of 253 US firms for the period 1979–1988 across
13 industrial groups: (i) the pecking order hypothesis; versus (ii) an optimal
capital structure, which is however time-varying in response to variations in
the business risk of the industry. Claggett examines these two hypotheses by
considering a firm with an initial low level of debt. If the pecking order
hypothesis is adhered to, the firm will prefer to use internally generated funds
over those that are obtained externally (debt and equity). Accordingly, the
firm’s capital structure should move away from rather than towards the
industry’s mean over time. Likewise, for firms that have higher levels of debt,
for any given income stream, retained earnings will be lower, resulting in the
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firm employing more debt, in turn causing their gearing levels to move away
from the industry’s norm over time. If on the other hand, there is an optimal
capital structure, firms’ capital structures will more nearly tend to converge
over time, once allowance is made for time-variations in the optimal capital
structure itself. Claggett (1991) finds weak evidence that firms’ capital
structures do indeed tend to converge over time, as do studies by Lev (1969),
Marsh (1982), Jalilvand and Harris (1984), and Murinde, Agung and
Mullineux (1999).
24 These studies use various different methodologies:
Marsh employs a logit model; Jalilvand and Harris employ a target-partial-
adjustment model; while Murinde, Agung and Mullineux use cointegration
techniques. Taken together, these studies do suggest the existence of optimal
industry target leverage levels for individual firms. However, there is some
evidence of asymmetries in convergence as between firms having an above-
average industry leverage ratio and those having a below-average leverage
ratio. This may provide a partial reconciliation between the static optimal
capital structure theory and the dynamic pecking order models of the firm.
Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) argue that it is possible to discriminate
between pecking order and static trade-off theories of capital structure by
a relatively simple technique. This involves a comparison between two
ordinary least squares regressions:
∆D=b 0 +b 1 (D*t –D t–1)+u t and  ∆Dt =a 0 +a 1 DEFt +v t (6)
In these regressions, ∆Dt is the change in a firm’s debt ratio, D*t is the optimal
debt ratio and Dt–1 the actual ratio in the previous period. DEFt is the
firm’s (flow) financing requirement, defined as the difference between
committed payments (capital spending, dividends, working capital and debt
repayment) and free cash flow. Shyam-Sunder and Myers argue that for non-
distressed firms, we would expect to find 0 < b1 < 1 if the static trade-off
theory is true; and a0 = 0 and a1 = 1 if the pecking order hypothesis is true.
They employ a sample of 157 US firms for which sources and uses data are
available from 1971. They find that 0 < b1 < 1, that a1 is positive but less than
unity, and that the pecking-order model has higher explanatory power than the
trade-off model. Shyam-Sunder and Myers also perform simulations of firm
debt policy under the two different hypotheses, and conclude that the power
24 Murinde, Agung and Mullineux (1999) empirically test for convergence in the EU in
terms of the structure of the financial systems as well as the patterns of corporate financing
activities by banks, bond markets, stock markets and NFCs themselves through retained
earnings; the results show convergence in terms of capital market activities only.of their test is such that the pecking order hypothesis should be preferred to
the trade-off model. This is questioned by Chirinko and Singha (2000) who
argue that the analysis is not robust to changes in the underlying model,
particularly in the specification of alternative hypotheses. For example, the
regression of ∆Dt on DEFt cannot easily distinguish between the pecking
order as proposed by Myers and Majluf (1984) and different financing
priorities such as internal financing followed by a preference for equity over
debt.
Overall therefore, the evidence on the pecking order hypothesis is still
inconclusive. One difficulty in comparing the pecking order with theories of
optimal capital structure is that the former is an essentially dynamic model
containing predictions of how a firm behaves over time and is more naturally
tested in that context. This requires time series data on individual firms and,
where such data are available in computerised form, they mostly have
a relatively short time dimension. Many of the records of company accounts
in the major industrial countries date back to the previous century, but
compiling these data for the purposes of investigating capital structure
questions is a Herculean task. See Shannon (1932). The problems in this
respect are likely to be more acute in studies of developing counties. On the
other hand, static trade-off theories are naturally tested using panel or cross-
section data, of which there is a general abundance, even in developing
countries. This suggests that there may be value in giving further
consideration to the ways in which the two classes of theory can be compared
within a cross-sectional context.
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8.1 Empirical determinants of capital structure
The discussion so far has concentrated on the testing of specific theories.
Many of these studies have generated further interesting empirical results as
a by-product of the main theoretical tests. In addition, there are numerous
other studies that are more empirically oriented, and aim to examine the
influence on leverage of certain specific variables. The hypotheses tested are
motivated by theoretical or empirical concerns, and involve the use of
a variety of more or less ad hoc variables that aim to measure the underlying
concepts to be tested. In this section therefore we examine these results,
organizing the discussion according to the main variables which have been
found by a large number of studies to influence the firm’s capital structure.
Appendix table A1 sets out in summary form the results of these studies, most
of which examine the role of specific firm characteristics in determining
leverage. A careful study of the table indicates a number of common
characteristics that are thought to determine capital structure: tangibility, size,
profitability, growth, firm risk, non-debt-tax-shields and industrial
classification (see also Rajan and Zingales, 1995). Each of these will now be
discussed in turn and will allow a comparison between a priori expectations
and empirical findings. The text tables that accompany this discussion
provide a more compact summary of the results for these main variables.
A few caveats apply when making this type of cross-study comparison. First,
in relation to the explanatory variables, proxies are always applied and are
difficult to interpret. Cross-study comparisons are done with results mostly
taken at face value, ignoring any differences in measurement, definition and
techniques, except insofar as these differences are crucial to an understanding
of the results. Second, leverage can be expressed as a ratio to either the market
or the book value of equity. The former is consistent with the theory of capital
structures. However, like the vast majority of the empirical literature, the
following results together with those of Appendix table A1 are those derived
under the book value of equity. This is for a number of reasons. First, the
market value of equity and leverage is dependent upon a number of factors
orthogonal to the firm; consequently, any changes in the leverage ratio when
using the market values may not reflect any underlying alteration within the
firm. Second, the market value of leverage is not readily obtainable, although
where data are available, they suggest that there is a high correlation between
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market and book values of leverage. See Bowman (1980). Thus, empirical
differences between book and market values should not be that great, ceteris
paribus. Third, Baskin (1989) suggests that the book debt ratio accurately
indicates the financing mix that managers actually obtain from outside
sources. Fourth and finally, book ratios better reflect management’s target
debt ratios. See Thies and Klock (1992).
8.2 Tangibility
The tangibility of assets represents the effect of the collateral value of assets
on the firm’s gearing level (Rajan and Zingales, 1995). Its a priori direction
of influence is debatable. Turning first to those studies that support a positive
relationship, recall that Galai and Masulis (1976), Jensen and Meckling
(1976), and Myers (1977) argue that stockholders of leveraged firms have an
incentive to invest sub-optimally, and thus transfer wealth away from the
firm’s bondholders. If however, debt can be secured against assets, the
borrower is restricted to using loaned funds for a specific project, and
creditors have an improved guarantee of repayment, depending on the value
of the assets used as collateral. Clearly, no such guarantee exists if unsecured
debt is used. This positive direction is further underlined by MyM. It is argued
that the process of selling debt secured against assets with known values will
reduce the asymmetric information costs of issuing debt. In addition, Scott
Table 4: The Influence of Tangibility on Firm Leverage (Section 8.2)
Notes: Signs within parentheses represent the direction of influence of insignificant coefficients.
1. found for short-term debt only.
2. found for long-term debt only.(1977) asserts that a transfer of wealth from unsecured to secured creditors
will occur when secured debt is used.
The main argument for a negative relationship between leverage and the level
of firm’s assets comes from Grossman and Hart (1982). It is argued that the
agency costs of managers consuming more than the optimal level of
perquisites increases for firms that have low levels of assets used as collateral.
This result arises because shareholder monitoring costs of capital outlays of
firms with fewer assets that can be used as collateral will be higher a priori
than those that have more collaterisable assets. Shareholders will therefore
prefer that firms with low levels of collateral assets should have higher
gearing levels, ceteris paribus. Thus, unlike Rajan and Zingales (1995) who
argue for only a positive relationship, overall, the theory suggests that the
influence of the collateral value of the firm’s assets on its leverage is
indeterminate.
Table 4 presents a summary of the empirical findings on the impact of
tangibility on the firm’s capital structure. The results are mixed: some support
a positive relationship, others show a negative relationship, and some are
indeterminate. It is clear a majority of studies provide support for a positive
impact of tangibility on firm leverage. This suggests that the evidence does
support the hypothesis that leverage reduces the ability of the firm to invest
sub-optimally, and that tangibility (collaterisable assets) diminishes the
information asymmetries associated with the issue of debt. Thus, we may
tentatively conclude that the evidence supports the hypothesis that
stockholder-debtholder conflicts of interest are reduced by firms securing
debt against assets.
8.3 Size
A number of authors including Warner (1977), Ang et al. (1982), and
Bradbury and Lloyd (1994) have shown that the firm’s bankruptcy costs are
quadratically related to its value, in such a way that bankruptcy costs are
found to be relatively smaller for large firms than for small ones. Titman and
Wessels (1988) argue that larger firms tend to be more diversified than their
smaller counterparts and are therefore less prone to collapse. Likewise, the
liquidation values of smaller firms are lower than their larger counterparts,
ceteris paribus. Accordingly, it will be more likely that bondholders get
a partial payment, indicating that agency costs of debt will be lower for larger
corporations. Furthermore, it is postulated that transaction costs will be
comparatively higher for smaller firms than for their larger peers.
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leverage and firm size. An alternative argument is that firm size can be
viewed as a proxy for information asymmetries between the firm and the
market. It is thought that the larger the firm, the more information that is
available for it and the lower the costs caused by information asymmetries,
ceteris paribus. In turn, this too would suggest a positive relationship between
size and debt, both long-term and short-term, ceteris paribus.
Table 5 shows that 65 percent of all those studies considered have found
a positive statistical dependence between size and firm leverage. This
suggests that the evidence does support our a priori expectations. However,
some of these studies have found a negative dependence, indicating that as the
size of the firm increases, the proportion of leverage incurred falls. In turn,
this suggests that large firms have larger agency, bankruptcy and costs of
asymmetric information. Titman and Wessels (1988) suggest that this finding
arises from small firms using more short-term finance than their larger
counterparts. That is, smaller firms have higher transactions costs when they
issue long-term debt or equity. The authors further add that such behaviour
may cause a “small firm risk effect”: by borrowing more short term, these
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Table 5: The influence of Size on Firm Leverage (Section 8.3)
Note: Signs within parentheses represent the direction of influence of insignificant coefficients.
1. dependent upon firm strategy.types of firms will be more sensitive to temporary economic downturns than
larger, more longer-geared firms.
8.4 Profitability
The traditional theories of financial development point to a positive
dependence between leverage levels and profitability. The argument here is
that the market will be reluctant to offer funds to those firms who are
currently unprofitable. Moreover, for those firms with poor shareholder
returns, increased leverage will result in heavy income gearing that will
depress equity valuation and restrict equity issues, ceteris paribus. On the
other hand, Donaldson (1961) argues that, as a result of transaction costs,
firms will prefer to raise capital from retained earnings, then from debt and
finally from issuing new equity: the transactions-costs motivation for the
pecking order hypothesis. Myers (1984) and Myers and Majluf (1984) draw
identical conclusions in explaining corporate financing decisions in the
presence of asymmetric information. Thus, a negative relationship may exist
between retained earnings and leverage ratios.
Table 6 presents a summary of empirical findings of those papers that have
examined the influence of profitability on firm leverage and surveyed by this
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Table 6: The Influence of Profitability on Firm Leverage (Section 8.4)
Notes: Signs within parentheses represent the direction of influence of insignificant coefficients.
1. found for past profitability only.
2. found under the net profit ratio which is defined as net profit divided by sales.review. Unlike the previous two attributes, the same number of studies find
statistical evidence for a positive relationship between profitability and
leverage as do those which find a negative relationship. In sum, the debate as
to whether firms adhere to the static theory or the traditional pecking-order
hypothesis remains unresolved.
8.5 Growth
Galai and Masulis (1976), Jensen and Meckling (1976), and Myers (1977),
amongst others, argue that when the firm issues debt, the managers have the
opportunity to engage in asset substitution, and transfer wealth away from
bondholders to shareholders. Jensen and Meckling (1976), Smith and Warner
(1979) and Green (1984) note that such moral hazard could be reduced by the
firm issuing convertible debt. On the other hand, Myers (1977) argues that if
the firm issues short-term rather than long-term debt, this problem will be
resolved; this suggests a positive dependence between short-term debt and
growth. This is a result that is found by Hall, Hutchinson, and Michaelas
(2000) in a study of 3000 unquoted small and medium-sized UK companies.
However, many studies do not distinguish carefully between long-term and
short-term debt; and unless this is done, a negative relationship between
leverage and growth is probably to be expected. This is consistent with the
increased operating efficiency hypothesis of Higgins (1977), who argues that
firms that are better managed rely less on outside financing. Indirectly, this
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Table 7: The Influence of Growth on Firm Leverage (Section 8.5)
Note: Signs within parentheses represent the direction of influence of insignificant coefficients.negative relationship can also be employed to test for the pecking order
hypothesis.
25
As with profitability, Table 7 shows that the main empirical research that has
examined the influence of growth on firm leverage suggests that the overall
direction of impact remains unresolved. A number of studies find support for
the a priori negative influence; conversely, a number of other studies have
found a positive dependence. These conflicting results may be due to the fact
that the growth measure tends to pick up the positive dependence between
leverage and tangibility. For example, there is an indirect link between
leverage and growth with firms borrowing against plant, machinery or other
assets when they are required to expand to meet the increase in sales that
accompany growth.
8.6 Firm risk
The theoretical literature argues that the greater the risk faced by a firm, the
lower its debt level. See DeAngelo and Masulis (1980). The argument here
is that an additional unit of debt increases the likelihood of bankruptcy for
the firm. For firms who have variability in their earnings, investors will
have little ability to accurately forecast future earnings based on publicly
available information. The market will see the firm as a “lemon” and
demand a premium in order to lend funds to it. In turn, this drives up the
costs of debt. Furthermore, Castanias (1983) argues that if the earnings level
of the firm is normally distributed, an increase in the business risk of
earnings will lead to an unambiguous increase in the risk of the firm
defaulting. This results in leverage becoming less attractive at the margin
implying that the optimal level of firm gearing falls. In addition,
any increase in the variability of the firm’s income implies that banks and
other lenders of finance will have a greater probability of forfeiting their
funds. In turn, they will be less willing to lend or will charge a higher risk
premium in comparison with firms who have lower levels of risk. A priori,
there should be a negative relationship between leverage levels and business
risk.
Scott (1977) as well as Jaffe and Westerfield (1987) note that this
relationship may not be monotonic and that under certain conditions this
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25 See, for example, the observation by Copeland and Weston (1988, p. 507) that, „an
unusually profitable firm in an industry with relatively slow growth ends up with an unusually
low debt-to-equity ratio“.relationship will instead be positive. Thies and Klock (1992) note that the
simulation results of Bradley, Jarrell and Kim (1984) point to the
dependence between these two variables being “U”-shaped. Moreover, the
clear strong negative a priori direction is not supported by the empirical
research that has tested the proposition, and which we have surveyed, as
reported in Table 8.
Nevertheless, a number of studies have found a positive dependence.
Indeed, a number of unusual observations may be noted. First, a positive
relationship with short-term debt is found by Thies and Klock (1992). It is
suggested that this is due to credit rationing: firms are restricted in the
extent to which they can borrow long-term, and therefore make up any
deficiencies using short-term debt. Second, the results of Kale et al. (1991)
show that risk is not monotonically related to leverage. Moreover, Shenoy
and Koch (1996) put forward an explanation for the positive dependence
between risk and the demand for debt. It is asserted that this is due to firms
with high leverage having a significantly greater amount of risk associated
with them i.e., there is a bi-directional relationship between risk and
leverage instead of a unidirectional relationship from risk to leverage. This
suggests a reconsideration of the estimation and testing procedures for these
variables.
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Table 8: The Influence of Risk on Firm Leverage (Section 8.6)
Notes: Signs within parentheses represent the direction of influence of insignificant coefficients.
1. under a quadratic risk measure.
2. found for short-term debt only.
3. dependent upon firm strategy.
4. found for long-term debt only.8.7 Non-debt tax shields
The basic point about corporate tax is that the firm will exploit the tax
deductibility of debt interest payments to reduce its tax bill. Therefore, firms
that have other tax shields, such as depreciation deductions, have less need to
exploit the debt tax shield. Indeed, if a firm in this position issues excessive
debt, it may become “tax-exhausted” in the sense of having potential tax
shields which it is unable to use. Ross (1985) explains that firms face
a decline in the expected value of their interest tax savings as outstanding
non-debt tax shields increase. See also Downs (1993). Thus, the incentive to
finance with debt diminishes as non-debt tax shields increase: debt is
“crowded out”. There is a further effect that arises from the risk of
bankruptcy. DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) postulate that the marginal
corporate savings from an additional unit of debt declines as non-debt tax
shields increase. This is a result of the increased likelihood of bankruptcy
occurring at higher debt levels. For low leverage levels, the marginal tax
shield value is positive since it can be fully employed to reduce the
company’s overall tax liability. For higher leverage levels, the marginal
advantage of debt is negative as a result of the increased probability that the
potential tax shield from an extra quantity of leverage will be partially or
totally lost through bankruptcy. These arguments would all suggest that there
should exist a negative relationship between debt and non-debt tax shields.
However, arguments also exist for a positive relationship between leverage
and non-debt tax shields. Scott (1977) and Moore (1986) suggest that firms
with substantial non-debt-tax-shields invariably have considerable collateral
assets which can be used to secure debt; and secured debt is less risky than
that which is unsecured. Overall then, these arguments suggest that the
expected effects of non-debt-tax-shields on the supply of debt by firms are not
known a priori.
It is also worth emphasising that, even if the effect of non-debt tax shields on
the supply of debt is known, the effect on leverage may nevertheless be
uncertain. For a given firm size, if the supply of debt falls, equity or retained
earnings must rise, ceteris paribus. However, if a change in the non-debt tax
shields of the firm is associated with a change in the size of the firm, then the
supply of equity and retained earnings may change endogenously, thus also
changing the firm’s leverage. This is most likely to be an issue for firms in
conditions of financial distress. In these conditions, a firm may sell collateral
assets, reducing its non-debt tax shields, and shrink in size, in an effort to
stave off bankruptcy. Even if, for example, debt is reduced, the leverage ratio
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associated with the reduction in debt.
26
Table 9 summarises the evidence on non-debt tax shields. The preponderance
of this evidence would suggest that there is, in fact, a negative relationship
between non-debt tax shields and leverage. However, a number of studies do
find a positive relationship. Moreover, there may be indirect relationships
between tax shields and leverage which cannot easily be uncovered by
a simple cross-sectional study. For example, Zarowin (1988) detects anegative
dependence between non-debt tax shields and common stock returns,
suggesting that stockholders do not, in fact, attribute positive value to tax
shields in the way one might expect. Apossible explanation for this and related
results is that the estimated relationship between tax shields and leverage
actually depends critically on the way in which the tax shields are measured.
Ignoring the maturity structure of the depreciation tax shield will cause the
drawing of incorrect inferences on the grounds that the firm’s long-term debt
ratio (considered within a time horizon greater than one period) will take into
account the value of its present and future tax-shields and must implicitly
impound the present value of them. Thus, the comparison of leverage with
a nominal annual depreciation deduction will not correctly estimate their true
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26 Of course, this is a general point in connection with any study of leverage. One cannot
always assume that firm size is, in some sense, exogenous to the analysis.
Table 9: The Influence of Non-debt Tax-shields on Firm Leverage (Section 8.7)
Notes: Signs within parentheses represent the direction of influence of insignificant
coefficients.
1. found for past NDTS.
2. negative influence found on long-term debt whilst a positive impact was noted for
short-term debt.long-run association. This suggests that non-debt tax shields should be
measured as the present value of expected tax depreciation deductions.
Downs (1993) extends this argument, and examines whether non-debt tax
shields crowd out debt financing. The sample is drawn from the US for the
period 1968 – 1985 across 10 two-digit industries. What separates Downs’
study from previous ones is the way in which how non-debt tax shields are
measured. Normally, depreciation and related items would be scaled by the
firm’s total assets so as to remove firm-specific heterogeneity effects, and to
reduce heteroskedasticity. Downs (1993) notes that this procedure ignores the
maturity structure of non-debt tax shields, and in particular, that of
depreciation. He proposes instead that the present value of the future stream
of depreciation charges should be applied. As the latter increases in relation
to pre-tax cash flows, the value of the tax shield provided by debt interest
payments, and its present value, decreases. Therefore, a better scaling of
depreciation charges would be provided by using pre-tax cash flows as
divisor, rather than the firm’s total assets. However, pre-tax cash flows alone
will underestimate debt crowding out per se, as they ignore the present value
of the firm’s future cash flows. To rectify this, the present value of these cash
flows should be employed. Once this is done, Downs does indeed find
a positive relationship between non-debt tax shields and leverage.
8.8 Industrial classification
The identification and usage of firms’ industrial classification are important
aspects of financial market research. Besides being used to explain corporate
capital structure characteristics, Kahle and Walking (1996, p. 311) note four
additional applications of industrial classification. They are applied: first, to
identify control firms within the same industry; second, to describe the
industrial composition of the sample; third to filter firms for specific
investigations; and fourth, to determine whether mergers and acquisitions are
horizontal, vertical or conglomerate. In common with all uses of industrial
groupings, the authors argue (p. 309) that researchers have been “cavalier” in
their application of these classifications. Specifically and, in relation to this
survey, a number of important issues have not been addressed: (i) consistent
classification of firms across different databases when using the same method
of compartmentalisation; (ii) consistency of corporate classification when
different procedures are applied; (iii) successful identification of utilities and
financials; and (iv) consistent grouping over time. In relation to (i),
discrepancies arise despite a common classification being applied. Kahle and
Walking (1996) argue that, a priori, the errors induced are expected to be
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classification (the fewer the digits), the greater the disparity among firms.
Turning to (ii), clearly different grouping procedures will be based on
different principals and will produce different classifications. Again a positive
relationship is expected to be observed between inconsistencies of corporate
classification and the level of classification used. In relation to (iii), in
comparison with other industries, utilities are typically regulated whereas
financials are regulated and have special capital characteristics, invariably
being highly leveraged. Thus, these two groups are generally isolated and will
have a higher level of conformity between various classification procedures.
As a rule of thumb, the more specialised the industry the firm is within, the
greater the accuracy of its classification across different categorising
procedures. In terms of (iv), many studies employ historic data. This will
induce errors in that, when the firm progresses to a different stage of growth
over time, its very structure, nature and industry may change. The
transformation of American Can into a financial services conglomerate is just
one of the more dramatic examples of this process.
Kahle and Walking (1996) argue that, in general, errors in the use of industrial
classification schemes are expected to be proportional to the level of
classification employed: a detailed four-digit SIC code will be more sensitive
than a coarser two-digit code to changes in corporate nature and product mix
over time. For example, using the first digit of the SIC code will only classify
firms into very broad categories, and this creates a number of very unlikely
industries: “It is doubtful that Olympia Brewing perceives Helena Rubinstein
or Standard Oil as competitors. All three are in the industry 2XXX.” (Bowen,
Daly and Huber, 1982, p. 11). Clearly this classification level is unacceptable.
Two digits classify corporations into better-defined groups, but Bowen, Daly
and Huber (1982) argue that such an apportionment may still be too coarse
and suggest a yet finer partition using four digits. A coarse partition has the
potential to create anomalies in comparisons among firms. However, a much
finer partition, such as the four-digit classification, creates instead the
potential for classification errors and anomalies within firms. Firms with
a range of business activities, especially but not exclusively conglomerates,
become increasingly difficult to allocate accurately to one particular group at
detailed levels of any industrial classification scheme. This suggests the
desirability of a coarser classification, such as the two-digit SIC codes, and
this is the conclusion reached, for example, by Clarke (1989).
The errors created under (i) to (iv) above are found within developed capital
markets where corporate data is widely published under tight institutional and
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distributed and published under such a rigid framework in developing
markets. See, inter alia, Kitchen (1986) and Whitley (1992). This suggests
that the problems involved in using industrial classifications will be more
acute in developing countries. In particular, the problem of comparability
within firms is likely to be more acute in many developing countries, where
there is a greater preponderance of industrial conglomerates than in the
industrial countries. See Prasad (2000). This also points to the desirability of
a coarser classification scheme in this context.
There are several reasons for thinking that the industry in which a firm
operates will have a significant effect on its capital structure. Agood example
is Titman (1984), who begins with the argument that the firm will choose
a level of leverage that will maximise its liquidation costs. It is postulated that
if the likelihood of liquidation of a firm increases, this will reduce its current
income stream. This effect may arise, according to Titman (1984), because,
post liquidation, the after-sales service of the firm will effectively disappear.
Prior to liquidation therefore, consumers are less likely to purchase durable
goods from the firm at risk, because of the expected increase in maintenance
costs of the product, following the firm’s disappearance. The more specialised
the product, the lower is the liquidation value of the firm, because the harder
it is to replace the after-sales service. A priori, this suggests that there will be
inter-industry differences in leverage across industries, as firms producing
more specialised products seek a level of leverage to help offset their lower
liquidation costs, ceteris paribus.
Table 10 summarises the literature on industrial classification and leverage.
This clearly suggests that firms located within different industries do have
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Table 10: The Influence of Industrial Classification on Firm Leverage (Section 8.8)different gearing levels. Harris and Raviv (1991) note that Drugs,
Instruments, Electronics and Food have low leverage whilst Paper, Textiles,
Mill Products, Steel, Airlines and Cement have high leverage. The authors
also note that utilities are more heavily geared than non-utilities. However, it
should be pointed out in conclusion of this section that identifying capital
structure differences between industries does not necessarily explain them,
since there is not a one-for-one relationship between a firm’s industrial group
and the degree of specialisation of its product.
8.9 Other variables
Appendix table A1 presents a summary of empirical findings relating to
a catalogue of variables that affect firm leverage. This evidence leads to the
following main observations.
It is shown that debt is used as a source of finance for the firm mainly due to
its tax advantages. Accordingly, the higher the tax rate, the larger the
advantages of using debt, resulting in its supply increasing. From the
empirical studies that have been surveyed by this review, it is clear that the
evidence here is mixed: Chowdhury and Miles (1989) as well as CGM
support such a relationship while Homaifa et al. (1994), Hussain (1995), Kim
and Sorensen (1986), Lowe et al. (1994) and Mackie-Mason (1990) find an
indeterminate influence. This is a clear PRI.
The studies also find that past leverage levels are negatively related
to present ones. This suggests that the firm (a) has a target capital
structure; and (b) employs an adjustment mechanism. Moreover, the
negative dependence suggests that any adjustments that take place decline
with time thereby indicating a converging capital structure path. On the
other hand, the evidence provided by Chowdhury and Miles (1989)
suggests that any costs of adjustment do not influence the firm’s capital
structure.
There seems to be further support for the pecking order hypothesis of MyM.
This is in the form of the negative relationship between liquidity and gearing
found by Hallet and Taffler (1982), Jordan et al. (1998), Shenoy and Koch
(1996), and by Lowe et al. (1994). However, a number of studies find that
liquidity does not have a statistical impact, see Chiarella et al. (1992),
Mackie-Mason (1990) and Chatrath (1994). CGM note a negative
dependence between equity and debt, suggesting that these two liabilities are
substitutes for each other.
72 Empirical results on general capital structure themesIt is also to be noted that there seems to be some support for
Williamson’s (1988) transactions-cost economics hypothesis, which suggests
that the more specialised assets of the firm will be financed using equity
rather than by debt. Downs (1993) as well as Titman and Wessels (1988) find
a negative dependence between debt and how unique the firm’s assets are.
Moreover, Munro (1996) finds that the higher is the level of the fixed assets
of a firm, the greater is its leverage. In turn, this suggests that the firm uses its
assets as collateral against which to secure debt.
Perhaps more surprising is the number of studies that effectively estimate
a demand equation for debt without including its price or cost within it.
However, Thies and Klock (1992) find a positive relationship between debt
and interest rates. A similar conclusion is noted by CGM when they use an
inter-bank market rate. Both observations are against a priori expectations
and suggest that firms within these studies engage in “distress borrowing”.
The application of interest rates on debt is a clear PRI that needs to be
explored further.
A final comment concerns the impact of inflation on the demand for debt.
A priori, inflation reduces the “real” cost of employing debt via the erosion of
the repayment of the principal. Accordingly, a positive dependence should be
noted between leverage and inflation, ceteris paribus. Homaifa et al.(1994)
find such a relationship. However, the authors also note that a negative
relationship is found with past levels of inflation.
8.10 Extensions of comparative research
An important general issue is to establish how far empirical results in one
country carry over to other countries, especially in widely varying
institutional settings. It is clear from our discussion in section 5 that much of
the emphasis in recent comparative research has been on documenting more
or less stylised facts through univariate studies. Evidently, it is important to
establish more precisely the causes of observed differences in outcomes in
different settings. This is a more difficult task, as it is not always apparent if
a uniform benchmark for comparison across countries can be established. An
interesting effort to apply conventional market-oriented theory to a bank-
based system is reported by Hirota (1999), who explores the determinants of
capital structure of between 407 and 546 Japanese firms in 4 cross-sections:
from 1977, 1982, 1987, and 1992. Hirota seeks to explain the leverage of
these firms by a combination of conventional capital structure variables (non-
debt tax shields, asset tangibility, growth opportunities, business risk,
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relationships (measured by the proportion of debt due to the largest bank
lender), keiretsu membership, regulation of new equity issues (measured by
a dummy representing firms who satisfy the voluntary code enforced by
major Japanese security companies between 1973 and 1996), and a variable
representing a firm’s incentive to exploit free cash flows (a firm-specific debt-
equity yield differential). Almost all the variables in both groups entered the
regressions with the expected sign in each of the 4 cross-sections, and most
were significant. This suggests that conventional capital structure theory can
help understand the behaviour of firms in a country that is usually thought to
be either “non-Anglo-Saxon” or at least bank-based. But the results for the
institutional variables also show that there is more to firm financial behaviour
in Japan than is captured by the conventional variables. For example, one
might expect the information-pooling which, in theory is involved in keiretsu
membership, to be impounded in variables such as profitability and the
market-to-book ratio (measuring growth opportunities). But, since keiretsu
membership helps explain leverage independently of profitability and the
market-to-book ratio, it is clearly not wholly impounded in these variables.
Gul (1999) reports similar findings to Hirota (1999), but for a shorter list of
explanatory variables. Gul investigates a panel of more than 1000 Japanese
firms covering 1988–1992. He finds that size, profitability, and growth
opportunities are all significant and correctly signed but that keiretsu
affiliation is also independently significant in explaining leverage. These two
studies raise interesting questions for further research. It would be very
useful, especially from a policy perspective, to understand more fully the
relationship between the conventional variables and the institutional variables
and, more particularly, to uncover the precise channels through which the
institutional variables do affect leverage.
A more explicitly comparative study is undertaken by Prasad (2000) who
studies the financing decisions of a sample of 165 Malay and 174 Thai
companies over the period 1987–1995. Although Prasad finds numerous
detailed differences in the behaviour of firms as between the two countries,
overall, a conventional capital structure model performs equally well in both
countries. Family ownership is a particularly important institutional issue in
southeast Asia. See for example Hussain’s (1995) study of Indonesian
companies. However, Prasad found little evidence that family ownership was
an important factor in either Malaysia or Thailand over and above
conventional capital structure determinants.
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The review carried out in this paper has concentrated on the main issues in the
literature on corporate financing, capital structure and firm ownership
structure. We have sought to codify the major hypotheses about corporate
financial behaviour, the extent to which they may be expected to be relevant
to low-income developing countries, and the state of the evidence concerning
these hypotheses. In this section, we summarise the main points and suggest
PRIs for a research programme on capital markets and development.
In the last 50 years, theoretical research has come full circle from the
traditional view of corporate capital structures. In the traditional view, the
firm’s cost of capital and its value are interdependent. MM’s seminal paper
turned this theory on its head and argued that the cost of capital is actually
independent of capital structure. However, when the perfect capital market
assumptions underlying MM are relaxed, it transpires that we reach
conclusions that are similar to those found under the traditional view.
Imperfections in the capital market can be divided into three groups: agency
costs, information asymmetries and taxation.
Agency costs arise in several situations involving shareholders, managers,
and debtholders. To alleviate shareholder-manager agency costs, the firm
issues debt over equity. However, this can lead to further costs involving
shareholders and debtholders. With regard to shareholder-manager costs, this
survey has emphasised the importance of corporate strategy for capital
structure. The work here has only recently been started and is a fertile ground
for future research. With regard to shareholder-debtholder costs, there are two
schools of thought: the Irrelevance Hypothesis and the Costly Contracting
Hypothesis (CCH). The former states that agency costs do not impact on
a firm’s value; while the latter asserts that they do affect a firm’s value, but
this effect can be mitigated by the use of covenants. In this context, we also
reviewed the impact of ownership structure (managerial and institutional) on
a firm’s capital structure; and the results of this research are still in their
relative infancy. This issue is particularly important for developing economies
where the role of institutional factors is particularly pronounced; and it is
a clear PRI for future work. See Whitley (1992).
The literature on information asymmetries emphasises the difference between
the information possessed by the firm and that possessed by the market, and
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order hypothesis which argues that firms do not have a unique long-run
optimal capital structure, but instead use a financing instrument of “first-
choice”, which is conditional on the state of each firm and of the market. The
theory explains how a firm chooses its incremental financing but not how (or
if) it chooses a particular long-run level of leverage. The second result,
suggested by managerial risk aversion, argues that there will be a positive
relationship between the level of equity held by management and the quality
of the firm. However, this result is also consistent with the shareholder-
manager agency cost literature, and illustrates a general problem in this field:
two very different theories generating similar empirical predictions. The third
result involves management’s use of debt as a device with which to signal the
quality of the firm. One of the implications of the model that is employed here
is that the level of the firm’s bankruptcy risk rises as its gearing increases.
This is identical to that noted under the traditional view and further illustrates
the theoretical literature coming full circle. However, the link between
gearing and the quality of firm management is still one which has to be
resolved. This is a clear PRI for theoretical work.
The third group of market imperfections is that associated with tax. The
relative levels of personal, corporate and capital taxes together with the type
of tax system (classical or imputation) will influence the capital structure of
the firm. In general, a firm will choose its leverage to set the marginal tax
benefits of debt equal to its costs. This gives rise to an optimal, static capital
structure, but one which may be augmented by considerations of bankruptcy
risk and non-debt tax shields.
A main conclusion that emerges from our survey of empirical work is that
only a limited number of studies have examined the financial behaviour of
firms within developing economies and capital markets. Thus, we do not yet
know how far theories that have been formulated for firms in developed
capital markets can be applied to those in developing countries. This
deficiency constitutes a critical PRI that must be addressed. It is also
a primary question that would need to be addressed by any research
programme on capital markets and development, given that policies towards
asset formation contribute to growth and poverty-reduction.
In terms of methodology, existing empirical research can be divided into those
that employ ratio analysis, and those that apply a formal multivariate model.
With regard to the former, we find that, following financial liberalisation in
many countries, the capital structures of firms found within traditional market-
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and regardless of the level of development, firms in most countries generally
place a heavy reliance on retained earnings as a source of finance. For
developing countries however, some studies suggest that firms follow
a reversed pecking order in their financing, a result which is at variance with the
evidence from the industrial countries, and therefore an important further PRI.
The results from multivariate models clearly imply that management is
concerned with the market value of the firm, as basic theory would suggest. By
gearing up their firms, managers enhance earnings per share and market value.
Large shareholders play a positive role in capital markets by lowering
monitoring costs and thus reducing the agency costs of debt. Bankruptcy costs
are a concave function of the market value of the firm at the time of bankruptcy.
However, research has so far has concentrated only on a small number of firms,
and on the direct costs of bankruptcy. Widening this research to include more
firms and to study indirect costs are both interesting PRIs. Direct testing of the
pecking order hypothesis employed several distinct methodologies, but most of
the evidence so far supports this hypothesis. However, the negative dependence
between profitability and leverage suggested by the pecking order is not clearly
supported in the empirical literature. In addition, we drew attention to the
difficulty of comparing pecking order and optimal capital structure theories: the
former being essentially a time series hypothesis and the latter a cross-sectional
hypothesis. For this reason, notwithstanding the evidence in favour of a pecking
order, we cannot conclude that pecking order theory should supplant optimal
capital structure theory. Indeed, the immense range of panel data studies that we
have reviewed testifies to the continuing strength of the optimal capital structure
hypothesis. Clearly this is an important subject for further research: hence aPRI.
Specific firm characteristics that have been found to influence capital
structure include: tangibility, size, profitability, growth, risk, non-debt tax
shields, and industrial classification. Larger companies in industrial countries
appear to use tangible assets as collateral for debt, whilst smaller firms seem
to face fewer information asymmetries. However, the combination of
inadequately defined property rights and inefficient capital markets may
undermine these two observations in the context of developing economies
and they therefore constitute two more PRIs. The impact of firm growth on
capital structure is ambiguous, as is the impact of risk. These are clearly
important factors in developing countries and are both PRIs for future work.
Equally important, this review has highlighted three major omissions from
the empirical literature surveyed. First there is considerable evidence to
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target may not be reached instantly, an adjustment mechanism is applied
which must be included within any capital structure model. This issue has
scarcely been tackled by the empirical literature. Second, the empirical
literature has mainly concentrated on the determinants of leverage. Although
a firm’s capital structure can be inferred from the identity: total assets = debt +
equity, there are advantages in considering both variables explicitly.
Moreover, there are substantial differences between the management and use
of shareholders’funds which are retained profits and those which derive from
the issued share capital of a company. A study of leverage sheds no explicit
light on the retentions-equity decision, and a considerable amount of
information that could be used to explain the financial behaviour of firms is
lost. An interesting PRI would be to consider the simultaneous impact of the
determinants of capital structure on both equity and debt, following
Chowdhury and Miles (1989), so as to produce a more informed picture of the
financial behaviour of the firm. Third, few studies have considered the direct
impact of the cost of debt, or any other liability, on the firm’s capital structure
decision. Research has so far effectively constructed a demand function for
debt without including its price: the interest rate that is charged. This is
important from the firm’s point of view since it is the actual cost of using
debt. An exciting PRI would investigate the impact of liability prices on the
financial behaviour of the firm. It would determine if these liability prices can
better explain corporate capital structure than those firm-specific
characteristics that have mainly been employed in the literature so far.
In conclusion, the empirical literature on corporate capital structure is
fragmented, and has so far paid relatively little attention to developing
countries. In this paper, we have substantially extended and updated the
review of empirical work contained in Harris and Raviv (1991).
27 We have
also aimed to classify the empirical results more systematically than has
previously been attempted. Our summary of the relationships among firms’
characteristics and their capital structures enables comparisons to be made
between theoretical predictions and empirical results and, more importantly,
it provides a benchmark that can be used by future researchers in the
construction of capital structure models. This should help reduce the, at times,
ethereal and ad-hoc methodologies that have been employed in many
empirical studies.
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27 It should be emphasised that the objective of Harris and Raviv’s paper was to provide
a detailed survey of the theoretical literature, with an intentionally shorter overview of the
empirical evidence.References
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90 ReferencesAppendix 1: Summary of Recent Empirical Research on
Corporate Capital Structure
General notes for appendix table A1(1) – (6)
Unless stated otherwise, the dependent variable is the book value of leverage/ gearing measures.
+/– positive/negative coefficients, respectively; and statistically significant.
? coefficients have indeterminate sign; and statistically significant.
ns coefficients not significant.
si coefficients significant (sign is immaterial).
Blanks within the table represent variables that were not tested for.
Table A1(1): Summary of Recent Empirical Research on Corporate Capital Structure
Notes: 1. Dependent upon the strategy followed by the firm; of the four types, two were found
to be positively related and two negatively. Overall, impact of this attribute was noted
to be indeterminate.
2.  When the market value of leverage was employed, risk was found to have
a significant negative influence on firm leverage. On the other hand, when the book
value of leverage was used, risk was found to have an insignificant impact on
leverage.  
91Table A1(2): Summary of Recent Empirical Research on Corporate Capital Structure
Notes:1. results taken from table 5, regression 1, p. 150.
2. results taken from table 2 using the book value of leverage.
3. results taken from table 6, p. 14.
4. quadratic risk measure employed here.
92 Appendix 1Table A1(3): Summary of Recent Empirical Research on Corporate Capital Structure
Notes: 1. Dependent upon the rate applied: negative influence is found with the inter-bank rate
whilst a positive one with the CD rate.
Appendix 1 93Table A1(4): Summary of Recent Empirical Research on Corporate Capital Structure
Notes: 1. results of estimates when the sample was unrestricted and was allowed to vary across
industries.
2. a negative dependence was noted for this variable post 1988.
94 Appendix 1Table A1(5): Summary of Recent Empirical Research on Corporate Capital Structure
Notes: 1. results of estimates contained within panel B, model III, pg. 327 using the book value
of leverage.
2. results were the same when either the book or market value of equity was employed.
3. this attribute has a positive coefficient in two of the four equations, and negative in
the other two.
4. significant only when the market value of equity was used.
5. coefficient was negative when using the market value of equity, and positive when
using the book value.
.
Appendix 1 95Table A1(6): Summary of Recent Empirical Research on Corporate Capital Structure
Notes: 1.  a negative/positive coefficient was found for this variable in the equation for
long/short–term debt.
2. coefficient for long–term debt was insignificant.
3.  a negative/positive coefficient was found for this variable in the equation for
short/long–term debt.
4. a positive coefficient was reported for some equations, negative and insignificant for
the rest.
5. significant in one out of four cross-section equations; significant at the 10% level in
the whole (pooled) dataset.
.
96 Appendix 1Appendix 2: Methodological Issues in Multivariate
Empirical Research on Capital Structure
A2.1 Single Equation Models
A majority of empirical studies employ a model in which leverage is
regressed on a list of explanatory variables:
d=f ( Xi) (A1)
where: d is a measure of firm gearing and Xi is a vector of explanatory
variables. The explanatory variables typically consist of empirical proxies
that capture certain latent (unobservable) attributes of the firm. Most
empirical research assumes a linear relationship between the underlying latent
variable and its proxy. Titman and Wessels (1988) note that linearity is an
unreliable assumption for a number of reasons: (i) the relationship between
the unobserved determinant and the observed proxy may be imperfect,
resulting in errors-in-variable problems when used in regressions analysis; (ii)
measurement errors in the proxy variable may be correlated to those of the
dependent variable thereby creating spurious correlation even though the
unobserved variable may be unrelated to the dependent variable; (iii) proxy
variables may be chosen by the goodness-of-fit criteria; however, bias may
arise in interpretation; and (iv) it is difficult to use measures of one attribute
that are unrelated to other variables of interest.
In principle, a linear structural model, such as LISREL, can be used to
overcome some of these problems, as it explicitly specifies the relation
between the unobservable attributes and the observable variables. See
Jöreskog and Sörbom (1981). Titman and Wessels (1988) and Chiarella et al.
(1992) use this technique. LISREL is basically a factor-analytic model
consisting of two parts: a measurement model and a structural model, which
are estimated simultaneously. In the measurement model, unobservable firm-
specific attributes are measured by relating them to observable variables, e.g.
accounting data. In the structural model, measured debt ratios are specified as
functions of the attributes defined in the measurement model. The
measurement model is specified as:
x=Λe+δ (A2)
97while the structural model can be specified as:
y=Γe+ε (A3)
where y is a px1 vector of individual firm debt ratios; x is a qx1 vector of
observable indicators; e is an mx1 vector of unobservable attributes; q is the
number of observable indicators; and m is the number of unobservable
attributes. Hence, Λ is a qxm matrix of regression coefficients; δ is a qx1
vector of measurement errors; Γ is a pxm matrix of factor loadings and ε is
a px1 vector of disturbance terms. The parameters of the model are estimated
by fitting the covariance matrix of observable variables implied by the
specification of the model to the covariance matrix of the variables observed
from the sample. See Jöreskog and Sörbom (1981) for details.
The form of non-linearity that can arise in corporate financial decisions is
often of the all-or-nothing variety as, for example, if the pecking-order
hypothesis predicts that a firm will not issue new equity in the current time
period. Discrete variable techniques (logit and probit) can be used to model
such decisions. For more detail on the precise techniques, see for example,
Greene (1993). The logit method can be used to model the relationship
between the probability of a firm switching from one branch of a decision
to another, subject to a vector of explanatory variables. For example,
Gardner and Trzcinka (1992) test Myers’ (1977) theory of the relationship
between a firm’s growth opportunities and its debt levels. They do this by
estimating a logit model giving the relationship between a firm’s growth
rate (and other variables) and the probability of its choosing all-equity
financing  versus debt and equity. Jordan et al. (1998) apply similar
procedures when modelling the impact of corporate strategy on the
firm’s capital structure.
The logit model is naturally applicable to problems of binary choice, i.e. when
a decision has only two possible outcomes. In more general situations, where
there are several possible outcomes, or a multi-step decision tree is to be
analysed, the probit model or sequential logit or probit is more applicable. For
example, Chehab (1995) applies a sequential probit model to investigate the
preferred choice of the firm between three or more financing alternatives.
This is a special case of a general multi-response model since it is used to
estimate successive sequential binary choices. Such an approach is used to
investigate the choices of financial sources and the popularity of one source
over another in relation to the firm’s characteristics. Ahabit persistence model
was also used to investigate if the financing choice of the previous period
98 Appendix 2determines the current one. Such a procedure can be used to test if the
firm’s management develops a preference or is forced by capital markets to
be persistent in the sources of funds.
A2.2 Multi-Equation Models
The single-equation methods reviewed above implicitly assume that capital
structure decisions can be thought of in a series of binary, or at least simple,
steps: choice of debt-equity ratio; whether or not to issue debt or equity; and
later, how much to issue; and so on. Arguably though, the capital structure
decision is better thought of as a single decision, involving the question as to
what type of financing to use, and simultaneously, that of how much of each
type to use. A convenient example is Jensen, Solberg, and Zorn (1992) who
estimate a cross-section model of the simultaneous determination by firms of
debt, dividends, and insider finance. Three (linear) equations are estimated as
follows:
Debt = f (Dividends, Insider, X1,X 2,X 3,X 4,)
Dividends = f (Debt, Insider, X1,X 2,X 6,X 7,) (A4)
Insider = f (Debt, Dividends, X1,X 3,X 5,X 8)
with: X1 = a measure of business risk; X2 = profitability; X3 = R & D spending
as a proxy for agency costs; X4 = fixed assets; X5 = size; X6 = growth rate;
X7 = investment; and X8 = the firm’s industry classification. This model is
a simultaneous equations model in the sense that the endogenous variables all
appear as explanatory variables in each other’s equation; that is, dividends,
debt and insider financing are assumed to impact on each other independently
of the other explanatory variables.
The problem with a system such as (4) is that it can only be identified if
sufficient exogenous variables are excluded from all three equations. This is
largely arbitrary and each exclusion restriction has the effect of restricting the
impact of the exogenous variables to effects that have to come via the other
endogenous variables. In contrast, Chowdhury, Green and Miles (CGM,
1994) argue that financing decisions are better treated by analogy with
portfolio decisions. This suggests respecifying (4) as a system of demand
equations, or perhaps more properly as supply equations of liabilities. CGM
(1994) adapt Cuthbertson’s (1985) buffer-stock approach to the demand for
money to analyse the determinants of UK companies’ short-term financial
decisions using a panel of 694 firms covering 1969 to 1983. The following
equations were estimated:
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The endogenous variables (fi, i =1 ... 4) are the short-term or “quick” financial
flows
28; Fj are the corresponding stocks of quick finance assets and liabilities;
mk are the cash flows generated by all other (mainstream) activities; Ml are the
stocks of assets and liabilities associated with mainstream activities; and Zh
are other explanatory variables (both firm-specific and economy-wide); αi,
τik, µij, δil, φih are parameters; and ui are the error terms. This specification is
somewhat analogous to Brainard and Tobin’s (1968) methods for modelling
financial asset demands, and is foreshadowed by the remarkable early
contribution of Heston (1962). Chowdhury and Miles (1989) use the same
approach to analyse UK companies’ debt, dividend, and equity decisions.
Given the appropriate degree of aggregation, total external long-term funding
is just the sum of equity and debt raised, less dividends paid. If these three
variables are treated as a simultaneous system of supply functions of
liabilities, with common explanatory variables, any one of the three equations
is “redundant”, because the parameters of any one equation can be inferred
from the parameters of the other two. See Greene (1993). Since equity issues
are typically intermittent, whereas debt and dividends are more usually
regular flows, the efficient estimation of an equation for equity flows poses
more difficult econometric problems than does the estimation of debt and
dividend equations. Chowdhury and Miles exploit this point to concentrate on
estimating equations for debt and dividends, which have the same general
linear structure as (5) with a common set of explanatory variables which test
for: taxation effects, the influence of macroeconomic variables, the cost of
funds, external regulatory controls, bankruptcy and other risk proxies,
learning and expectations proxies, and the impact of the firm size.
It would appear that the system approach is a methodological improvement
over the single equation approach, especially, as noted earlier by Tobin and
Brainard (1968), because it forces the investigator to confront the broader
implications of any estimated model. For example, a model may appear to
offer a sensible explanation for debt and dividends, but its implications for
equity issues may be nonsensical. However, the models of Jensen, Solberg,
and Zorn, and Chowdhury and Miles are essentially static cross-section
explanations of capital structure, and do not consider adjustment
mechanisms. This is important, for as Fischer, Heinkel and Zechner (1989)
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28 They consist of trade credit given and received, bank borrowing and liquid assets.observe:  “Large transaction costs could possibly explain the wide
observation in actual debt ratios, since firms would be forced into long
excursions away from their initial debt ratios. …If adjustment costs are
large, so that some firms take extended excursions away from their targets,
then we ought to give less attention to refining our static trade-off stories
and relatively more to understanding what adjustment costs are, why they
are so important and how rational managers would respond to them”.
Myers (1984) and Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) also emphasize this
point. Static optimisation generates an optimal leverage level for any firm.
This optimum will change over time in response to changes in the external
factors. This suggests the need for a dynamic multivariate approach to
modelling capital structure.
The response to this argument is limited to a relatively few papers, in part
because many balanced panels of company accounts data do not have a time
dimension which is sufficiently long to estimate the necessary dynamics.
Chowdhury, Green and Miles (1990) develop and estimate the dynamic and
the long-run implications of their model, but argue that, if short-term finance
is a buffer, the long-run equilibrium is either notional or largely irrelevant.
Chehab’s (1995) habit-persistence model is effectively also a dynamic model
of the firm’s financing behaviour. Homaifa et al. (1994) use an autoregressive
distributed lag (ADL) model to study the capital structure decisions of a panel
of 370 US firms for the period 1979–1988. Possibly the most complete
attempt to reconcile static and dynamic theories of capital structure is due to
Vogt (1994), who constructs a partial stock adjustment model to test the
pecking order hypothesis. His model assumes that there is a value-
maximising capital structure for each firm, but that transactions costs,
information asymmetries and corporate control issues prevent the firm from
instantaneously reaching this point and give rise to an adjustment mechanism.
If the existence of a target capital structure is rejected then there is support for
the pecking order hypothesis.
.
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